| ... | ... | @@ -8,12 +8,12 @@ const assert = std.debug.assert; |
| 8 | 8 | const Certificate = std.crypto.Certificate; |
| 9 | 9 | |
| 10 | 10 | const max_ciphertext_len = tls.max_ciphertext_len; |
| 11 | const hmacExpandLabel = tls.hmacExpandLabel; |
| 11 | 12 | const hkdfExpandLabel = tls.hkdfExpandLabel; |
| 12 | | const int2 = tls.int2; |
| 13 | | const int3 = tls.int3; |
| 13 | const int = tls.int; |
| 14 | 14 | const array = tls.array; |
| 15 | | const enum_array = tls.enum_array; |
| 16 | 15 | |
| 16 | tls_version: tls.ProtocolVersion, |
| 17 | 17 | read_seq: u64, |
| 18 | 18 | write_seq: u64, |
| 19 | 19 | /// The starting index of cleartext bytes inside `partially_read_buffer`. |
| ... | ... | @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ received_close_notify: bool, |
| 33 | 33 | /// This makes the application vulnerable to truncation attacks unless the |
| 34 | 34 | /// application layer itself verifies that the amount of data received equals |
| 35 | 35 | /// the amount of data expected, such as HTTP with the Content-Length header. |
| 36 | | allow_truncation_attacks: bool = false, |
| 36 | allow_truncation_attacks: bool, |
| 37 | 37 | application_cipher: tls.ApplicationCipher, |
| 38 | 38 | /// The size is enough to contain exactly one TLSCiphertext record. |
| 39 | 39 | /// This buffer is segmented into four parts: |
| ... | ... | @@ -44,6 +44,24 @@ application_cipher: tls.ApplicationCipher, |
| 44 | 44 | /// The fields `partial_cleartext_idx`, `partial_ciphertext_idx`, and |
| 45 | 45 | /// `partial_ciphertext_end` describe the span of the segments. |
| 46 | 46 | partially_read_buffer: [tls.max_ciphertext_record_len]u8, |
| 47 | /// If non-null, ssl secrets are logged to a file. Creating such a log file allows other |
| 48 | /// programs with access to that file to decrypt all traffic over this connection. |
| 49 | ssl_key_log: ?struct { |
| 50 | client_key_seq: u64, |
| 51 | server_key_seq: u64, |
| 52 | client_random: [32]u8, |
| 53 | file: std.fs.File, |
| 54 | |
| 55 | fn clientCounter(key_log: *@This()) u64 { |
| 56 | defer key_log.client_key_seq += 1; |
| 57 | return key_log.client_key_seq; |
| 58 | } |
| 59 | |
| 60 | fn serverCounter(key_log: *@This()) u64 { |
| 61 | defer key_log.server_key_seq += 1; |
| 62 | return key_log.server_key_seq; |
| 63 | } |
| 64 | }, |
| 47 | 65 | |
| 48 | 66 | /// This is an example of the type that is needed by the read and write |
| 49 | 67 | /// functions. It can have any fields but it must at least have these |
| ... | ... | @@ -88,6 +106,32 @@ pub const StreamInterface = struct { |
| 88 | 106 | } |
| 89 | 107 | }; |
| 90 | 108 | |
| 109 | pub const Options = struct { |
| 110 | /// How to perform host verification of server certificates. |
| 111 | host: union(enum) { |
| 112 | /// No host verification is performed, which prevents a trusted connection from |
| 113 | /// being established. |
| 114 | no_verification, |
| 115 | /// Verify that the server certificate was issues for a given host. |
| 116 | explicit: []const u8, |
| 117 | }, |
| 118 | /// How to verify the authenticity of server certificates. |
| 119 | ca: union(enum) { |
| 120 | /// No ca verification is performed, which prevents a trusted connection from |
| 121 | /// being established. |
| 122 | no_verification, |
| 123 | /// Verify that the server certificate is a valid self-signed certificate. |
| 124 | /// This provides no authorization guarantees, as anyone can create a |
| 125 | /// self-signed certificate. |
| 126 | self_signed, |
| 127 | /// Verify that the server certificate is authorized by a given ca bundle. |
| 128 | bundle: Certificate.Bundle, |
| 129 | }, |
| 130 | /// If non-null, ssl secrets are logged to this file. Creating such a log file allows |
| 131 | /// other programs with access to that file to decrypt all traffic over this connection. |
| 132 | ssl_key_log_file: ?std.fs.File = null, |
| 133 | }; |
| 134 | |
| 91 | 135 | pub fn InitError(comptime Stream: type) type { |
| 92 | 136 | return std.mem.Allocator.Error || Stream.WriteError || Stream.ReadError || tls.AlertDescription.Error || error{ |
| 93 | 137 | InsufficientEntropy, |
| ... | ... | @@ -136,326 +180,186 @@ pub fn InitError(comptime Stream: type) type { |
| 136 | 180 | }; |
| 137 | 181 | } |
| 138 | 182 | |
| 139 | | /// Initiates a TLS handshake and establishes a TLSv1.3 session with `stream`, which |
| 183 | /// Initiates a TLS handshake and establishes a TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3 session with `stream`, which |
| 140 | 184 | /// must conform to `StreamInterface`. |
| 141 | 185 | /// |
| 142 | 186 | /// `host` is only borrowed during this function call. |
| 143 | | pub fn init(stream: anytype, ca_bundle: Certificate.Bundle, host: []const u8) InitError(@TypeOf(stream))!Client { |
| 187 | pub fn init(stream: anytype, options: Options) InitError(@TypeOf(stream))!Client { |
| 188 | const host = switch (options.host) { |
| 189 | .no_verification => "", |
| 190 | .explicit => |host| host, |
| 191 | }; |
| 144 | 192 | const host_len: u16 = @intCast(host.len); |
| 145 | 193 | |
| 146 | | var random_buffer: [128]u8 = undefined; |
| 194 | var random_buffer: [176]u8 = undefined; |
| 147 | 195 | crypto.random.bytes(&random_buffer); |
| 148 | | const hello_rand = random_buffer[0..32].*; |
| 196 | const client_hello_rand = random_buffer[0..32].*; |
| 197 | var key_seq: u64 = 0; |
| 198 | var server_hello_rand: [32]u8 = undefined; |
| 149 | 199 | const legacy_session_id = random_buffer[32..64].*; |
| 150 | | const x25519_kp_seed = random_buffer[64..96].*; |
| 151 | | const secp256r1_kp_seed = random_buffer[96..128].*; |
| 152 | 200 | |
| 153 | | const x25519_kp = crypto.dh.X25519.KeyPair.create(x25519_kp_seed) catch |err| switch (err) { |
| 154 | | // Only possible to happen if the private key is all zeroes. |
| 155 | | error.IdentityElement => return error.InsufficientEntropy, |
| 156 | | }; |
| 157 | | const secp256r1_kp = crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP256Sha256.KeyPair.create(secp256r1_kp_seed) catch |err| switch (err) { |
| 158 | | // Only possible to happen if the private key is all zeroes. |
| 201 | var key_share = KeyShare.init(random_buffer[64..176].*) catch |err| switch (err) { |
| 202 | // Only possible to happen if the seed is all zeroes. |
| 159 | 203 | error.IdentityElement => return error.InsufficientEntropy, |
| 160 | 204 | }; |
| 161 | | const ml_kem768_kp = crypto.kem.ml_kem.MLKem768.KeyPair.create(null) catch {}; |
| 162 | 205 | |
| 163 | | const extensions_payload = |
| 164 | | tls.extension(.supported_versions, [_]u8{ |
| 165 | | 0x02, // byte length of supported versions |
| 166 | | 0x03, 0x04, // TLS 1.3 |
| 167 | | }) ++ tls.extension(.signature_algorithms, enum_array(tls.SignatureScheme, &.{ |
| 206 | const extensions_payload = tls.extension(.supported_versions, array(u8, tls.ProtocolVersion, .{ |
| 207 | .tls_1_3, |
| 208 | .tls_1_2, |
| 209 | })) ++ tls.extension(.signature_algorithms, array(u16, tls.SignatureScheme, .{ |
| 168 | 210 | .ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, |
| 169 | 211 | .ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, |
| 212 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha256, |
| 213 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha384, |
| 214 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha512, |
| 170 | 215 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, |
| 171 | 216 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, |
| 172 | 217 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, |
| 218 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha256, |
| 219 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha384, |
| 220 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha512, |
| 221 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha1, |
| 173 | 222 | .ed25519, |
| 174 | | })) ++ tls.extension(.supported_groups, enum_array(tls.NamedGroup, &.{ |
| 223 | })) ++ tls.extension(.supported_groups, array(u16, tls.NamedGroup, .{ |
| 175 | 224 | .x25519_ml_kem768, |
| 176 | 225 | .secp256r1, |
| 226 | .secp384r1, |
| 177 | 227 | .x25519, |
| 178 | | })) ++ tls.extension( |
| 179 | | .key_share, |
| 180 | | array(1, int2(@intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.x25519)) ++ |
| 181 | | array(1, x25519_kp.public_key) ++ |
| 182 | | int2(@intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.secp256r1)) ++ |
| 183 | | array(1, secp256r1_kp.public_key.toUncompressedSec1()) ++ |
| 184 | | int2(@intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.x25519_ml_kem768)) ++ |
| 185 | | array(1, x25519_kp.public_key ++ ml_kem768_kp.public_key.toBytes())), |
| 186 | | ) ++ |
| 187 | | int2(@intFromEnum(tls.ExtensionType.server_name)) ++ |
| 188 | | int2(host_len + 5) ++ // byte length of this extension payload |
| 189 | | int2(host_len + 3) ++ // server_name_list byte count |
| 190 | | [1]u8{0x00} ++ // name_type |
| 191 | | int2(host_len); |
| 228 | })) ++ tls.extension(.psk_key_exchange_modes, array(u8, tls.PskKeyExchangeMode, .{ |
| 229 | .psk_dhe_ke, |
| 230 | })) ++ tls.extension(.key_share, array( |
| 231 | u16, |
| 232 | u8, |
| 233 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.x25519_ml_kem768)) ++ |
| 234 | array(u16, u8, key_share.ml_kem768_kp.public_key.toBytes() ++ key_share.x25519_kp.public_key) ++ |
| 235 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.secp256r1)) ++ |
| 236 | array(u16, u8, key_share.secp256r1_kp.public_key.toUncompressedSec1()) ++ |
| 237 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.secp384r1)) ++ |
| 238 | array(u16, u8, key_share.secp384r1_kp.public_key.toUncompressedSec1()) ++ |
| 239 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.NamedGroup.x25519)) ++ |
| 240 | array(u16, u8, key_share.x25519_kp.public_key), |
| 241 | )); |
| 242 | const server_name_extension = int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ExtensionType.server_name)) ++ |
| 243 | int(u16, 2 + 1 + 2 + host_len) ++ // byte length of this extension payload |
| 244 | int(u16, 1 + 2 + host_len) ++ // server_name_list byte count |
| 245 | .{0x00} ++ // name_type |
| 246 | int(u16, host_len); |
| 247 | const server_name_extension_len = switch (options.host) { |
| 248 | .no_verification => 0, |
| 249 | .explicit => server_name_extension.len + host_len, |
| 250 | }; |
| 192 | 251 | |
| 193 | 252 | const extensions_header = |
| 194 | | int2(@intCast(extensions_payload.len + host_len)) ++ |
| 195 | | extensions_payload; |
| 196 | | |
| 197 | | const legacy_compression_methods = 0x0100; |
| 253 | int(u16, @intCast(extensions_payload.len + server_name_extension_len)) ++ |
| 254 | extensions_payload ++ |
| 255 | server_name_extension; |
| 198 | 256 | |
| 199 | 257 | const client_hello = |
| 200 | | int2(@intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 201 | | hello_rand ++ |
| 258 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 259 | client_hello_rand ++ |
| 202 | 260 | [1]u8{32} ++ legacy_session_id ++ |
| 203 | 261 | cipher_suites ++ |
| 204 | | int2(legacy_compression_methods) ++ |
| 262 | array(u8, tls.CompressionMethod, .{.null}) ++ |
| 205 | 263 | extensions_header; |
| 206 | 264 | |
| 207 | | const out_handshake = |
| 208 | | [_]u8{@intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.client_hello)} ++ |
| 209 | | int3(@intCast(client_hello.len + host_len)) ++ |
| 265 | const out_handshake = .{@intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.client_hello)} ++ |
| 266 | int(u24, @intCast(client_hello.len - server_name_extension.len + server_name_extension_len)) ++ |
| 210 | 267 | client_hello; |
| 211 | 268 | |
| 212 | | const plaintext_header = [_]u8{ |
| 213 | | @intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake), |
| 214 | | 0x03, 0x01, // legacy_record_version |
| 215 | | } ++ int2(@intCast(out_handshake.len + host_len)) ++ out_handshake; |
| 269 | const cleartext_header_buf = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake)} ++ |
| 270 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_0)) ++ |
| 271 | int(u16, @intCast(out_handshake.len - server_name_extension.len + server_name_extension_len)) ++ |
| 272 | out_handshake; |
| 273 | const cleartext_header = switch (options.host) { |
| 274 | .no_verification => cleartext_header_buf[0 .. cleartext_header_buf.len - server_name_extension.len], |
| 275 | .explicit => &cleartext_header_buf, |
| 276 | }; |
| 216 | 277 | |
| 217 | 278 | { |
| 218 | 279 | var iovecs = [_]std.posix.iovec_const{ |
| 219 | | .{ |
| 220 | | .base = &plaintext_header, |
| 221 | | .len = plaintext_header.len, |
| 222 | | }, |
| 223 | | .{ |
| 224 | | .base = host.ptr, |
| 225 | | .len = host.len, |
| 226 | | }, |
| 280 | .{ .base = cleartext_header.ptr, .len = cleartext_header.len }, |
| 281 | .{ .base = host.ptr, .len = host.len }, |
| 227 | 282 | }; |
| 228 | | try stream.writevAll(&iovecs); |
| 283 | try stream.writevAll(iovecs[0..if (host.len == 0) 1 else 2]); |
| 229 | 284 | } |
| 230 | 285 | |
| 231 | | const client_hello_bytes1 = plaintext_header[5..]; |
| 232 | | |
| 233 | | var handshake_cipher: tls.HandshakeCipher = undefined; |
| 234 | | var handshake_buffer: [8000]u8 = undefined; |
| 235 | | var d: tls.Decoder = .{ .buf = &handshake_buffer }; |
| 236 | | { |
| 237 | | try d.readAtLeastOurAmt(stream, tls.record_header_len); |
| 238 | | const ct = d.decode(tls.ContentType); |
| 239 | | d.skip(2); // legacy_record_version |
| 240 | | const record_len = d.decode(u16); |
| 241 | | try d.readAtLeast(stream, record_len); |
| 242 | | const server_hello_fragment = d.buf[d.idx..][0..record_len]; |
| 243 | | var ptd = try d.sub(record_len); |
| 244 | | switch (ct) { |
| 245 | | .alert => { |
| 246 | | try ptd.ensure(2); |
| 247 | | const level = ptd.decode(tls.AlertLevel); |
| 248 | | const desc = ptd.decode(tls.AlertDescription); |
| 249 | | _ = level; |
| 250 | | |
| 251 | | // if this isn't a error alert, then it's a closure alert, which makes no sense in a handshake |
| 252 | | try desc.toError(); |
| 253 | | // TODO: handle server-side closures |
| 254 | | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 255 | | }, |
| 256 | | .handshake => { |
| 257 | | try ptd.ensure(4); |
| 258 | | const handshake_type = ptd.decode(tls.HandshakeType); |
| 259 | | if (handshake_type != .server_hello) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 260 | | const length = ptd.decode(u24); |
| 261 | | var hsd = try ptd.sub(length); |
| 262 | | try hsd.ensure(2 + 32 + 1 + 32 + 2 + 1 + 2); |
| 263 | | const legacy_version = hsd.decode(u16); |
| 264 | | const random = hsd.array(32); |
| 265 | | if (mem.eql(u8, random, &tls.hello_retry_request_sequence)) { |
| 266 | | // This is a HelloRetryRequest message. This client implementation |
| 267 | | // does not expect to get one. |
| 268 | | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 269 | | } |
| 270 | | const legacy_session_id_echo_len = hsd.decode(u8); |
| 271 | | if (legacy_session_id_echo_len != 32) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 272 | | const legacy_session_id_echo = hsd.array(32); |
| 273 | | if (!mem.eql(u8, legacy_session_id_echo, &legacy_session_id)) |
| 274 | | return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 275 | | const cipher_suite_tag = hsd.decode(tls.CipherSuite); |
| 276 | | hsd.skip(1); // legacy_compression_method |
| 277 | | const extensions_size = hsd.decode(u16); |
| 278 | | var all_extd = try hsd.sub(extensions_size); |
| 279 | | var supported_version: u16 = 0; |
| 280 | | var shared_key: []const u8 = undefined; |
| 281 | | var have_shared_key = false; |
| 282 | | while (!all_extd.eof()) { |
| 283 | | try all_extd.ensure(2 + 2); |
| 284 | | const et = all_extd.decode(tls.ExtensionType); |
| 285 | | const ext_size = all_extd.decode(u16); |
| 286 | | var extd = try all_extd.sub(ext_size); |
| 287 | | switch (et) { |
| 288 | | .supported_versions => { |
| 289 | | if (supported_version != 0) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 290 | | try extd.ensure(2); |
| 291 | | supported_version = extd.decode(u16); |
| 292 | | }, |
| 293 | | .key_share => { |
| 294 | | if (have_shared_key) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 295 | | have_shared_key = true; |
| 296 | | try extd.ensure(4); |
| 297 | | const named_group = extd.decode(tls.NamedGroup); |
| 298 | | const key_size = extd.decode(u16); |
| 299 | | try extd.ensure(key_size); |
| 300 | | switch (named_group) { |
| 301 | | .x25519_ml_kem768 => { |
| 302 | | const xksl = crypto.dh.X25519.public_length; |
| 303 | | const hksl = xksl + crypto.kem.ml_kem.MLKem768.ciphertext_length; |
| 304 | | if (key_size != hksl) |
| 305 | | return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 306 | | const server_ks = extd.array(hksl); |
| 307 | | |
| 308 | | shared_key = &((crypto.dh.X25519.scalarmult( |
| 309 | | x25519_kp.secret_key, |
| 310 | | server_ks[0..xksl].*, |
| 311 | | ) catch return error.TlsDecryptFailure) ++ (ml_kem768_kp.secret_key.decaps( |
| 312 | | server_ks[xksl..hksl], |
| 313 | | ) catch return error.TlsDecryptFailure)); |
| 314 | | }, |
| 315 | | .x25519 => { |
| 316 | | const ksl = crypto.dh.X25519.public_length; |
| 317 | | if (key_size != ksl) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 318 | | const server_pub_key = extd.array(ksl); |
| 319 | | |
| 320 | | shared_key = &(crypto.dh.X25519.scalarmult( |
| 321 | | x25519_kp.secret_key, |
| 322 | | server_pub_key.*, |
| 323 | | ) catch return error.TlsDecryptFailure); |
| 324 | | }, |
| 325 | | .secp256r1 => { |
| 326 | | const server_pub_key = extd.slice(key_size); |
| 327 | | |
| 328 | | const PublicKey = crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP256Sha256.PublicKey; |
| 329 | | const pk = PublicKey.fromSec1(server_pub_key) catch { |
| 330 | | return error.TlsDecryptFailure; |
| 331 | | }; |
| 332 | | const mul = pk.p.mulPublic(secp256r1_kp.secret_key.bytes, .big) catch { |
| 333 | | return error.TlsDecryptFailure; |
| 334 | | }; |
| 335 | | shared_key = &mul.affineCoordinates().x.toBytes(.big); |
| 336 | | }, |
| 337 | | else => { |
| 338 | | return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 339 | | }, |
| 340 | | } |
| 341 | | }, |
| 342 | | else => {}, |
| 343 | | } |
| 344 | | } |
| 345 | | if (!have_shared_key) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 346 | | |
| 347 | | const tls_version = if (supported_version == 0) legacy_version else supported_version; |
| 348 | | if (tls_version != @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_3)) |
| 349 | | return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 350 | | |
| 351 | | switch (cipher_suite_tag) { |
| 352 | | inline .AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 353 | | .AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
| 354 | | .CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 355 | | .AEGIS_256_SHA512, |
| 356 | | .AEGIS_128L_SHA256, |
| 357 | | => |tag| { |
| 358 | | const P = std.meta.TagPayloadByName(tls.HandshakeCipher, @tagName(tag)); |
| 359 | | handshake_cipher = @unionInit(tls.HandshakeCipher, @tagName(tag), .{ |
| 360 | | .handshake_secret = undefined, |
| 361 | | .master_secret = undefined, |
| 362 | | .client_handshake_key = undefined, |
| 363 | | .server_handshake_key = undefined, |
| 364 | | .client_finished_key = undefined, |
| 365 | | .server_finished_key = undefined, |
| 366 | | .client_handshake_iv = undefined, |
| 367 | | .server_handshake_iv = undefined, |
| 368 | | .transcript_hash = P.Hash.init(.{}), |
| 369 | | }); |
| 370 | | const p = &@field(handshake_cipher, @tagName(tag)); |
| 371 | | p.transcript_hash.update(client_hello_bytes1); // Client Hello part 1 |
| 372 | | p.transcript_hash.update(host); // Client Hello part 2 |
| 373 | | p.transcript_hash.update(server_hello_fragment); |
| 374 | | const hello_hash = p.transcript_hash.peek(); |
| 375 | | const zeroes = [1]u8{0} ** P.Hash.digest_length; |
| 376 | | const early_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&[1]u8{0}, &zeroes); |
| 377 | | const empty_hash = tls.emptyHash(P.Hash); |
| 378 | | const hs_derived_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, early_secret, "derived", &empty_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 379 | | p.handshake_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&hs_derived_secret, shared_key); |
| 380 | | const ap_derived_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.handshake_secret, "derived", &empty_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 381 | | p.master_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&ap_derived_secret, &zeroes); |
| 382 | | const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.handshake_secret, "c hs traffic", &hello_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 383 | | const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.handshake_secret, "s hs traffic", &hello_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 384 | | p.client_finished_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "finished", "", P.Hmac.key_length); |
| 385 | | p.server_finished_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "finished", "", P.Hmac.key_length); |
| 386 | | p.client_handshake_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length); |
| 387 | | p.server_handshake_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length); |
| 388 | | p.client_handshake_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length); |
| 389 | | p.server_handshake_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length); |
| 390 | | }, |
| 391 | | else => { |
| 392 | | return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 393 | | }, |
| 394 | | } |
| 395 | | }, |
| 396 | | else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage, |
| 397 | | } |
| 398 | | } |
| 399 | | |
| 400 | | // This is used for two purposes: |
| 286 | var tls_version: tls.ProtocolVersion = undefined; |
| 287 | // These are used for two purposes: |
| 401 | 288 | // * Detect whether a certificate is the first one presented, in which case |
| 402 | 289 | // we need to verify the host name. |
| 290 | var cert_index: usize = 0; |
| 403 | 291 | // * Flip back and forth between the two cleartext buffers in order to keep |
| 404 | 292 | // the previous certificate in memory so that it can be verified by the |
| 405 | 293 | // next one. |
| 406 | | var cert_index: usize = 0; |
| 294 | var cert_buf_index: usize = 0; |
| 295 | var write_seq: u64 = 0; |
| 407 | 296 | var read_seq: u64 = 0; |
| 408 | 297 | var prev_cert: Certificate.Parsed = undefined; |
| 409 | | // Set to true once a trust chain has been established from the first |
| 410 | | // certificate to a root CA. |
| 298 | const CipherState = enum { |
| 299 | /// No cipher is in use |
| 300 | cleartext, |
| 301 | /// Handshake cipher is in use |
| 302 | handshake, |
| 303 | /// Application cipher is in use |
| 304 | application, |
| 305 | }; |
| 306 | var pending_cipher_state: CipherState = .cleartext; |
| 307 | var cipher_state = pending_cipher_state; |
| 411 | 308 | const HandshakeState = enum { |
| 309 | /// In this state we expect only a server hello message. |
| 310 | hello, |
| 412 | 311 | /// In this state we expect only an encrypted_extensions message. |
| 413 | 312 | encrypted_extensions, |
| 414 | | /// In this state we expect certificate messages. |
| 313 | /// In this state we expect certificate handshake messages. |
| 415 | 314 | certificate, |
| 416 | 315 | /// In this state we expect certificate or certificate_verify messages. |
| 417 | 316 | /// certificate messages are ignored since the trust chain is already |
| 418 | 317 | /// established. |
| 419 | 318 | trust_chain_established, |
| 420 | | /// In this state, we expect only the finished message. |
| 319 | /// In this state, we expect only the server_hello_done handshake message. |
| 320 | server_hello_done, |
| 321 | /// In this state, we expect only the finished handshake message. |
| 421 | 322 | finished, |
| 422 | 323 | }; |
| 423 | | var handshake_state: HandshakeState = .encrypted_extensions; |
| 424 | | var cleartext_bufs: [2][8000]u8 = undefined; |
| 425 | | var main_cert_pub_key_algo: Certificate.AlgorithmCategory = undefined; |
| 426 | | var main_cert_pub_key_buf: [600]u8 = undefined; |
| 427 | | var main_cert_pub_key_len: u16 = undefined; |
| 324 | var handshake_state: HandshakeState = .hello; |
| 325 | var handshake_cipher: tls.HandshakeCipher = undefined; |
| 326 | var main_cert_pub_key: CertificatePublicKey = undefined; |
| 428 | 327 | const now_sec = std.time.timestamp(); |
| 429 | 328 | |
| 430 | | while (true) { |
| 329 | var cleartext_fragment_start: usize = 0; |
| 330 | var cleartext_fragment_end: usize = 0; |
| 331 | var cleartext_bufs: [2][tls.max_ciphertext_inner_record_len]u8 = undefined; |
| 332 | var handshake_buffer: [tls.max_ciphertext_record_len]u8 = undefined; |
| 333 | var d: tls.Decoder = .{ .buf = &handshake_buffer }; |
| 334 | fragment: while (true) { |
| 431 | 335 | try d.readAtLeastOurAmt(stream, tls.record_header_len); |
| 432 | | const record_header = d.buf[d.idx..][0..5]; |
| 433 | | const ct = d.decode(tls.ContentType); |
| 336 | const record_header = d.buf[d.idx..][0..tls.record_header_len]; |
| 337 | const record_ct = d.decode(tls.ContentType); |
| 434 | 338 | d.skip(2); // legacy_version |
| 435 | 339 | const record_len = d.decode(u16); |
| 436 | 340 | try d.readAtLeast(stream, record_len); |
| 437 | 341 | var record_decoder = try d.sub(record_len); |
| 438 | | switch (ct) { |
| 439 | | .change_cipher_spec => { |
| 440 | | try record_decoder.ensure(1); |
| 441 | | if (record_decoder.decode(u8) != 0x01) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 442 | | }, |
| 443 | | .application_data => { |
| 444 | | const cleartext_buf = &cleartext_bufs[cert_index % 2]; |
| 445 | | |
| 446 | | const cleartext = switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 447 | | inline else => |*p| c: { |
| 448 | | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 449 | | const ciphertext_len = record_len - P.AEAD.tag_length; |
| 450 | | try record_decoder.ensure(ciphertext_len + P.AEAD.tag_length); |
| 451 | | const ciphertext = record_decoder.slice(ciphertext_len); |
| 452 | | if (ciphertext.len > cleartext_buf.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow; |
| 453 | | const cleartext = cleartext_buf[0..ciphertext.len]; |
| 342 | var ctd, const ct = content: switch (cipher_state) { |
| 343 | .cleartext => .{ record_decoder, record_ct }, |
| 344 | .handshake => { |
| 345 | std.debug.assert(tls_version == .tls_1_3); |
| 346 | if (record_ct != .application_data) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 347 | try record_decoder.ensure(record_len); |
| 348 | const cleartext_buf = &cleartext_bufs[cert_buf_index % 2]; |
| 349 | switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 350 | inline else => |*p| { |
| 351 | const pv = &p.version.tls_1_3; |
| 352 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A; |
| 353 | if (record_len < P.AEAD.tag_length) return error.TlsRecordOverflow; |
| 354 | const ciphertext = record_decoder.slice(record_len - P.AEAD.tag_length); |
| 355 | const cleartext_fragment_buf = cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_end..]; |
| 356 | if (ciphertext.len > cleartext_fragment_buf.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow; |
| 357 | const cleartext = cleartext_fragment_buf[0..ciphertext.len]; |
| 454 | 358 | const auth_tag = record_decoder.array(P.AEAD.tag_length).*; |
| 455 | 359 | const nonce = if (builtin.zig_backend == .stage2_x86_64 and |
| 456 | 360 | P.AEAD.nonce_length > comptime std.simd.suggestVectorLength(u8) orelse 1) |
| 457 | 361 | nonce: { |
| 458 | | var nonce = p.server_handshake_iv; |
| 362 | var nonce = pv.server_handshake_iv; |
| 459 | 363 | const operand = std.mem.readInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], .big); |
| 460 | 364 | std.mem.writeInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], operand ^ read_seq, .big); |
| 461 | 365 | break :nonce nonce; |
| ... | ... | @@ -463,268 +367,559 @@ pub fn init(stream: anytype, ca_bundle: Certificate.Bundle, host: []const u8) In |
| 463 | 367 | const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8); |
| 464 | 368 | const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8); |
| 465 | 369 | const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(read_seq))); |
| 466 | | break :nonce @as(V, p.server_handshake_iv) ^ operand; |
| 370 | break :nonce @as(V, pv.server_handshake_iv) ^ operand; |
| 467 | 371 | }; |
| 468 | | read_seq += 1; |
| 469 | | P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag, record_header, nonce, p.server_handshake_key) catch |
| 372 | P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag, record_header, nonce, pv.server_handshake_key) catch |
| 470 | 373 | return error.TlsBadRecordMac; |
| 471 | | break :c @constCast(mem.trimRight(u8, cleartext, "\x00")); |
| 374 | cleartext_fragment_end += std.mem.trimRight(u8, cleartext, "\x00").len; |
| 472 | 375 | }, |
| 473 | | }; |
| 474 | | |
| 475 | | const inner_ct: tls.ContentType = @enumFromInt(cleartext[cleartext.len - 1]); |
| 476 | | if (inner_ct != .handshake) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 376 | } |
| 377 | read_seq += 1; |
| 378 | cleartext_fragment_end -= 1; |
| 379 | const ct: tls.ContentType = @enumFromInt(cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_end]); |
| 380 | if (ct != .handshake) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 381 | break :content .{ tls.Decoder.fromTheirSlice(@constCast(cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_start..cleartext_fragment_end])), ct }; |
| 382 | }, |
| 383 | .application => { |
| 384 | std.debug.assert(tls_version == .tls_1_2); |
| 385 | if (record_ct != .handshake) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 386 | try record_decoder.ensure(record_len); |
| 387 | const cleartext_buf = &cleartext_bufs[cert_buf_index % 2]; |
| 388 | switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 389 | inline else => |*p| { |
| 390 | const pv = &p.version.tls_1_2; |
| 391 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A; |
| 392 | if (record_len < P.record_iv_length + P.mac_length) return error.TlsRecordOverflow; |
| 393 | const message_len: u16 = record_len - P.record_iv_length - P.mac_length; |
| 394 | const cleartext_fragment_buf = cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_end..]; |
| 395 | if (message_len > cleartext_fragment_buf.len) return error.TlsRecordOverflow; |
| 396 | const cleartext = cleartext_fragment_buf[0..message_len]; |
| 397 | const ad = std.mem.toBytes(big(read_seq)) ++ |
| 398 | record_header[0 .. 1 + 2] ++ |
| 399 | std.mem.toBytes(big(message_len)); |
| 400 | const record_iv = record_decoder.array(P.record_iv_length).*; |
| 401 | const masked_read_seq = read_seq & |
| 402 | comptime std.math.shl(u64, std.math.maxInt(u64), 8 * P.record_iv_length); |
| 403 | const nonce: [P.AEAD.nonce_length]u8 = if (builtin.zig_backend == .stage2_x86_64 and |
| 404 | P.AEAD.nonce_length > comptime std.simd.suggestVectorLength(u8) orelse 1) |
| 405 | nonce: { |
| 406 | var nonce = pv.app_cipher.server_write_IV ++ record_iv; |
| 407 | const operand = std.mem.readInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], .big); |
| 408 | std.mem.writeInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], operand ^ masked_read_seq, .big); |
| 409 | break :nonce nonce; |
| 410 | } else nonce: { |
| 411 | const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8); |
| 412 | const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8); |
| 413 | const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(masked_read_seq))); |
| 414 | break :nonce @as(V, pv.app_cipher.server_write_IV ++ record_iv) ^ operand; |
| 415 | }; |
| 416 | const ciphertext = record_decoder.slice(message_len); |
| 417 | const auth_tag = record_decoder.array(P.mac_length); |
| 418 | P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag.*, ad, nonce, pv.app_cipher.server_write_key) catch return error.TlsBadRecordMac; |
| 419 | cleartext_fragment_end += message_len; |
| 420 | }, |
| 421 | } |
| 422 | read_seq += 1; |
| 423 | break :content .{ tls.Decoder.fromTheirSlice(cleartext_buf[cleartext_fragment_start..cleartext_fragment_end]), record_ct }; |
| 424 | }, |
| 425 | }; |
| 426 | switch (ct) { |
| 427 | .alert => { |
| 428 | ctd.ensure(2) catch continue :fragment; |
| 429 | const level = ctd.decode(tls.AlertLevel); |
| 430 | const desc = ctd.decode(tls.AlertDescription); |
| 431 | _ = level; |
| 477 | 432 | |
| 478 | | var ctd = tls.Decoder.fromTheirSlice(cleartext[0 .. cleartext.len - 1]); |
| 479 | | while (true) { |
| 480 | | try ctd.ensure(4); |
| 481 | | const handshake_type = ctd.decode(tls.HandshakeType); |
| 482 | | const handshake_len = ctd.decode(u24); |
| 483 | | var hsd = try ctd.sub(handshake_len); |
| 484 | | const wrapped_handshake = ctd.buf[ctd.idx - handshake_len - 4 .. ctd.idx]; |
| 485 | | const handshake = ctd.buf[ctd.idx - handshake_len .. ctd.idx]; |
| 486 | | switch (handshake_type) { |
| 487 | | .encrypted_extensions => { |
| 488 | | if (handshake_state != .encrypted_extensions) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 489 | | handshake_state = .certificate; |
| 490 | | switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 491 | | inline else => |*p| p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake), |
| 492 | | } |
| 433 | // if this isn't a error alert, then it's a closure alert, which makes no sense in a handshake |
| 434 | try desc.toError(); |
| 435 | // TODO: handle server-side closures |
| 436 | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 437 | }, |
| 438 | .change_cipher_spec => { |
| 439 | ctd.ensure(1) catch continue :fragment; |
| 440 | if (ctd.decode(tls.ChangeCipherSpecType) != .change_cipher_spec) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 441 | cipher_state = pending_cipher_state; |
| 442 | }, |
| 443 | .handshake => while (true) { |
| 444 | ctd.ensure(4) catch continue :fragment; |
| 445 | const handshake_type = ctd.decode(tls.HandshakeType); |
| 446 | const handshake_len = ctd.decode(u24); |
| 447 | var hsd = ctd.sub(handshake_len) catch continue :fragment; |
| 448 | const wrapped_handshake = ctd.buf[ctd.idx - handshake_len - 4 .. ctd.idx]; |
| 449 | switch (handshake_type) { |
| 450 | .server_hello => { |
| 451 | if (cipher_state != .cleartext) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 452 | if (handshake_state != .hello) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 453 | try hsd.ensure(2 + 32 + 1); |
| 454 | const legacy_version = hsd.decode(u16); |
| 455 | @memcpy(&server_hello_rand, hsd.array(32)); |
| 456 | if (mem.eql(u8, &server_hello_rand, &tls.hello_retry_request_sequence)) { |
| 457 | // This is a HelloRetryRequest message. This client implementation |
| 458 | // does not expect to get one. |
| 459 | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 460 | } |
| 461 | const legacy_session_id_echo_len = hsd.decode(u8); |
| 462 | try hsd.ensure(legacy_session_id_echo_len + 2 + 1); |
| 463 | const legacy_session_id_echo = hsd.slice(legacy_session_id_echo_len); |
| 464 | const cipher_suite_tag = hsd.decode(tls.CipherSuite); |
| 465 | hsd.skip(1); // legacy_compression_method |
| 466 | var supported_version: ?u16 = null; |
| 467 | if (!hsd.eof()) { |
| 493 | 468 | try hsd.ensure(2); |
| 494 | | const total_ext_size = hsd.decode(u16); |
| 495 | | var all_extd = try hsd.sub(total_ext_size); |
| 469 | const extensions_size = hsd.decode(u16); |
| 470 | var all_extd = try hsd.sub(extensions_size); |
| 496 | 471 | while (!all_extd.eof()) { |
| 497 | | try all_extd.ensure(4); |
| 472 | try all_extd.ensure(2 + 2); |
| 498 | 473 | const et = all_extd.decode(tls.ExtensionType); |
| 499 | 474 | const ext_size = all_extd.decode(u16); |
| 500 | | const extd = try all_extd.sub(ext_size); |
| 501 | | _ = extd; |
| 475 | var extd = try all_extd.sub(ext_size); |
| 502 | 476 | switch (et) { |
| 503 | | .server_name => {}, |
| 477 | .supported_versions => { |
| 478 | if (supported_version) |_| return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 479 | try extd.ensure(2); |
| 480 | supported_version = extd.decode(u16); |
| 481 | }, |
| 482 | .key_share => { |
| 483 | if (key_share.getSharedSecret()) |_| return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 484 | try extd.ensure(4); |
| 485 | const named_group = extd.decode(tls.NamedGroup); |
| 486 | const key_size = extd.decode(u16); |
| 487 | try extd.ensure(key_size); |
| 488 | try key_share.exchange(named_group, extd.slice(key_size)); |
| 489 | }, |
| 504 | 490 | else => {}, |
| 505 | 491 | } |
| 506 | 492 | } |
| 507 | | }, |
| 508 | | .certificate => cert: { |
| 509 | | switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 510 | | inline else => |*p| p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake), |
| 511 | | } |
| 512 | | switch (handshake_state) { |
| 513 | | .certificate => {}, |
| 514 | | .trust_chain_established => break :cert, |
| 515 | | else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage, |
| 516 | | } |
| 517 | | try hsd.ensure(1 + 4); |
| 518 | | const cert_req_ctx_len = hsd.decode(u8); |
| 519 | | if (cert_req_ctx_len != 0) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 520 | | const certs_size = hsd.decode(u24); |
| 521 | | var certs_decoder = try hsd.sub(certs_size); |
| 522 | | while (!certs_decoder.eof()) { |
| 523 | | try certs_decoder.ensure(3); |
| 524 | | const cert_size = certs_decoder.decode(u24); |
| 525 | | const certd = try certs_decoder.sub(cert_size); |
| 526 | | |
| 527 | | const subject_cert: Certificate = .{ |
| 528 | | .buffer = certd.buf, |
| 529 | | .index = @intCast(certd.idx), |
| 530 | | }; |
| 531 | | const subject = try subject_cert.parse(); |
| 532 | | if (cert_index == 0) { |
| 533 | | // Verify the host on the first certificate. |
| 534 | | try subject.verifyHostName(host); |
| 535 | | |
| 536 | | // Keep track of the public key for the |
| 537 | | // certificate_verify message later. |
| 538 | | main_cert_pub_key_algo = subject.pub_key_algo; |
| 539 | | const pub_key = subject.pubKey(); |
| 540 | | if (pub_key.len > main_cert_pub_key_buf.len) |
| 541 | | return error.CertificatePublicKeyInvalid; |
| 542 | | @memcpy(main_cert_pub_key_buf[0..pub_key.len], pub_key); |
| 543 | | main_cert_pub_key_len = @intCast(pub_key.len); |
| 544 | | } else { |
| 545 | | try prev_cert.verify(subject, now_sec); |
| 546 | | } |
| 493 | } |
| 547 | 494 | |
| 548 | | if (ca_bundle.verify(subject, now_sec)) |_| { |
| 549 | | handshake_state = .trust_chain_established; |
| 550 | | break :cert; |
| 551 | | } else |err| switch (err) { |
| 552 | | error.CertificateIssuerNotFound => {}, |
| 553 | | else => |e| return e, |
| 554 | | } |
| 495 | tls_version = @enumFromInt(supported_version orelse legacy_version); |
| 496 | switch (tls_version) { |
| 497 | .tls_1_3 => if (!mem.eql(u8, legacy_session_id_echo, &legacy_session_id)) return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 498 | .tls_1_2 => if (mem.eql(u8, server_hello_rand[24..31], "DOWNGRD") and |
| 499 | server_hello_rand[31] >> 1 == 0x00) return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 500 | else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 501 | } |
| 555 | 502 | |
| 556 | | prev_cert = subject; |
| 557 | | cert_index += 1; |
| 503 | switch (cipher_suite_tag) { |
| 504 | inline .AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 505 | .AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
| 506 | .CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 507 | .AEGIS_256_SHA512, |
| 508 | .AEGIS_128L_SHA256, |
| 509 | |
| 510 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 511 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
| 512 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 513 | => |tag| { |
| 514 | handshake_cipher = @unionInit(tls.HandshakeCipher, @tagName(tag.with()), .{ |
| 515 | .transcript_hash = .init(.{}), |
| 516 | .version = undefined, |
| 517 | }); |
| 518 | const p = &@field(handshake_cipher, @tagName(tag.with())); |
| 519 | p.transcript_hash.update(cleartext_header[tls.record_header_len..]); // Client Hello part 1 |
| 520 | p.transcript_hash.update(host); // Client Hello part 2 |
| 521 | p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake); |
| 522 | }, |
| 523 | |
| 524 | else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 525 | } |
| 526 | switch (tls_version) { |
| 527 | .tls_1_3 => { |
| 528 | switch (cipher_suite_tag) { |
| 529 | inline .AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 530 | .AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
| 531 | .CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 532 | .AEGIS_256_SHA512, |
| 533 | .AEGIS_128L_SHA256, |
| 534 | => |tag| { |
| 535 | const sk = key_share.getSharedSecret() orelse return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 536 | const p = &@field(handshake_cipher, @tagName(tag.with())); |
| 537 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A; |
| 538 | const hello_hash = p.transcript_hash.peek(); |
| 539 | const zeroes = [1]u8{0} ** P.Hash.digest_length; |
| 540 | const early_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&[1]u8{0}, &zeroes); |
| 541 | const empty_hash = tls.emptyHash(P.Hash); |
| 542 | p.version = .{ .tls_1_3 = undefined }; |
| 543 | const pv = &p.version.tls_1_3; |
| 544 | const hs_derived_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, early_secret, "derived", &empty_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 545 | pv.handshake_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&hs_derived_secret, sk); |
| 546 | const ap_derived_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.handshake_secret, "derived", &empty_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 547 | pv.master_secret = P.Hkdf.extract(&ap_derived_secret, &zeroes); |
| 548 | const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.handshake_secret, "c hs traffic", &hello_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 549 | const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.handshake_secret, "s hs traffic", &hello_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 550 | if (options.ssl_key_log_file) |key_log_file| logSecrets(key_log_file, .{ |
| 551 | .client_random = &client_hello_rand, |
| 552 | }, .{ |
| 553 | .SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &server_secret, |
| 554 | .CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &client_secret, |
| 555 | }); |
| 556 | pv.client_finished_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "finished", "", P.Hmac.key_length); |
| 557 | pv.server_finished_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "finished", "", P.Hmac.key_length); |
| 558 | pv.client_handshake_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length); |
| 559 | pv.server_handshake_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length); |
| 560 | pv.client_handshake_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length); |
| 561 | pv.server_handshake_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length); |
| 562 | }, |
| 563 | else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 564 | } |
| 565 | pending_cipher_state = .handshake; |
| 566 | handshake_state = .encrypted_extensions; |
| 567 | }, |
| 568 | .tls_1_2 => switch (cipher_suite_tag) { |
| 569 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 570 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
| 571 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 572 | => handshake_state = .certificate, |
| 573 | else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 574 | }, |
| 575 | else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 576 | } |
| 577 | }, |
| 578 | .encrypted_extensions => { |
| 579 | if (tls_version != .tls_1_3) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 580 | if (cipher_state != .handshake) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 581 | if (handshake_state != .encrypted_extensions) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 582 | switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 583 | inline else => |*p| p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake), |
| 584 | } |
| 585 | try hsd.ensure(2); |
| 586 | const total_ext_size = hsd.decode(u16); |
| 587 | var all_extd = try hsd.sub(total_ext_size); |
| 588 | while (!all_extd.eof()) { |
| 589 | try all_extd.ensure(4); |
| 590 | const et = all_extd.decode(tls.ExtensionType); |
| 591 | const ext_size = all_extd.decode(u16); |
| 592 | const extd = try all_extd.sub(ext_size); |
| 593 | _ = extd; |
| 594 | switch (et) { |
| 595 | .server_name => {}, |
| 596 | else => {}, |
| 597 | } |
| 598 | } |
| 599 | handshake_state = .certificate; |
| 600 | }, |
| 601 | .certificate => cert: { |
| 602 | if (cipher_state == .application) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 603 | switch (handshake_state) { |
| 604 | .certificate => {}, |
| 605 | .trust_chain_established => break :cert, |
| 606 | else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage, |
| 607 | } |
| 608 | switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 609 | inline else => |*p| p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake), |
| 610 | } |
| 558 | 611 | |
| 612 | switch (tls_version) { |
| 613 | .tls_1_3 => { |
| 614 | try hsd.ensure(1 + 3); |
| 615 | const cert_req_ctx_len = hsd.decode(u8); |
| 616 | if (cert_req_ctx_len != 0) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 617 | }, |
| 618 | .tls_1_2 => try hsd.ensure(3), |
| 619 | else => unreachable, |
| 620 | } |
| 621 | const certs_size = hsd.decode(u24); |
| 622 | var certs_decoder = try hsd.sub(certs_size); |
| 623 | while (!certs_decoder.eof()) { |
| 624 | try certs_decoder.ensure(3); |
| 625 | const cert_size = certs_decoder.decode(u24); |
| 626 | const certd = try certs_decoder.sub(cert_size); |
| 627 | |
| 628 | if (tls_version == .tls_1_3) { |
| 559 | 629 | try certs_decoder.ensure(2); |
| 560 | 630 | const total_ext_size = certs_decoder.decode(u16); |
| 561 | 631 | const all_extd = try certs_decoder.sub(total_ext_size); |
| 562 | 632 | _ = all_extd; |
| 563 | 633 | } |
| 564 | | }, |
| 565 | | .certificate_verify => { |
| 566 | | switch (handshake_state) { |
| 567 | | .trust_chain_established => handshake_state = .finished, |
| 568 | | .certificate => return error.TlsCertificateNotVerified, |
| 569 | | else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage, |
| 570 | | } |
| 571 | 634 | |
| 572 | | try hsd.ensure(4); |
| 573 | | const scheme = hsd.decode(tls.SignatureScheme); |
| 574 | | const sig_len = hsd.decode(u16); |
| 575 | | try hsd.ensure(sig_len); |
| 576 | | const encoded_sig = hsd.slice(sig_len); |
| 577 | | const max_digest_len = 64; |
| 578 | | var verify_buffer: [64 + 34 + max_digest_len]u8 = |
| 579 | | ([1]u8{0x20} ** 64) ++ |
| 580 | | "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00".* ++ |
| 581 | | @as([max_digest_len]u8, undefined); |
| 582 | | |
| 583 | | const verify_bytes = switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 584 | | inline else => |*p| v: { |
| 585 | | const transcript_digest = p.transcript_hash.peek(); |
| 586 | | verify_buffer[verify_buffer.len - max_digest_len ..][0..transcript_digest.len].* = transcript_digest; |
| 587 | | p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake); |
| 588 | | break :v verify_buffer[0 .. verify_buffer.len - max_digest_len + transcript_digest.len]; |
| 589 | | }, |
| 635 | const subject_cert: Certificate = .{ |
| 636 | .buffer = certd.buf, |
| 637 | .index = @intCast(certd.idx), |
| 590 | 638 | }; |
| 591 | | const main_cert_pub_key = main_cert_pub_key_buf[0..main_cert_pub_key_len]; |
| 592 | | |
| 593 | | switch (scheme) { |
| 594 | | inline .ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, |
| 595 | | .ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, |
| 596 | | => |comptime_scheme| { |
| 597 | | if (main_cert_pub_key_algo != .X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) |
| 598 | | return error.TlsBadSignatureScheme; |
| 599 | | const Ecdsa = SchemeEcdsa(comptime_scheme); |
| 600 | | const sig = try Ecdsa.Signature.fromDer(encoded_sig); |
| 601 | | const key = try Ecdsa.PublicKey.fromSec1(main_cert_pub_key); |
| 602 | | try sig.verify(verify_bytes, key); |
| 603 | | }, |
| 604 | | inline .rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, |
| 605 | | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, |
| 606 | | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, |
| 607 | | => |comptime_scheme| { |
| 608 | | if (main_cert_pub_key_algo != .rsaEncryption) |
| 609 | | return error.TlsBadSignatureScheme; |
| 610 | | |
| 611 | | const Hash = SchemeHash(comptime_scheme); |
| 612 | | const rsa = Certificate.rsa; |
| 613 | | const components = try rsa.PublicKey.parseDer(main_cert_pub_key); |
| 614 | | const exponent = components.exponent; |
| 615 | | const modulus = components.modulus; |
| 616 | | switch (modulus.len) { |
| 617 | | inline 128, 256, 512 => |modulus_len| { |
| 618 | | const key = try rsa.PublicKey.fromBytes(exponent, modulus); |
| 619 | | const sig = rsa.PSSSignature.fromBytes(modulus_len, encoded_sig); |
| 620 | | try rsa.PSSSignature.verify(modulus_len, sig, verify_bytes, key, Hash); |
| 621 | | }, |
| 622 | | else => { |
| 623 | | return error.TlsBadRsaSignatureBitCount; |
| 624 | | }, |
| 625 | | } |
| 639 | const subject = try subject_cert.parse(); |
| 640 | if (cert_index == 0) { |
| 641 | // Verify the host on the first certificate. |
| 642 | switch (options.host) { |
| 643 | .no_verification => {}, |
| 644 | .explicit => try subject.verifyHostName(host), |
| 645 | } |
| 646 | |
| 647 | // Keep track of the public key for the |
| 648 | // certificate_verify message later. |
| 649 | try main_cert_pub_key.init(subject.pub_key_algo, subject.pubKey()); |
| 650 | } else { |
| 651 | try prev_cert.verify(subject, now_sec); |
| 652 | } |
| 653 | |
| 654 | switch (options.ca) { |
| 655 | .no_verification => { |
| 656 | handshake_state = .trust_chain_established; |
| 657 | break :cert; |
| 626 | 658 | }, |
| 627 | | inline .ed25519 => |comptime_scheme| { |
| 628 | | if (main_cert_pub_key_algo != .curveEd25519) return error.TlsBadSignatureScheme; |
| 629 | | const Eddsa = SchemeEddsa(comptime_scheme); |
| 630 | | if (encoded_sig.len != Eddsa.Signature.encoded_length) return error.InvalidEncoding; |
| 631 | | const sig = Eddsa.Signature.fromBytes(encoded_sig[0..Eddsa.Signature.encoded_length].*); |
| 632 | | if (main_cert_pub_key.len != Eddsa.PublicKey.encoded_length) return error.InvalidEncoding; |
| 633 | | const key = try Eddsa.PublicKey.fromBytes(main_cert_pub_key[0..Eddsa.PublicKey.encoded_length].*); |
| 634 | | try sig.verify(verify_bytes, key); |
| 659 | .self_signed => { |
| 660 | try subject.verify(subject, now_sec); |
| 661 | handshake_state = .trust_chain_established; |
| 662 | break :cert; |
| 635 | 663 | }, |
| 636 | | else => { |
| 637 | | return error.TlsBadSignatureScheme; |
| 664 | .bundle => |ca_bundle| if (ca_bundle.verify(subject, now_sec)) |_| { |
| 665 | handshake_state = .trust_chain_established; |
| 666 | break :cert; |
| 667 | } else |err| switch (err) { |
| 668 | error.CertificateIssuerNotFound => {}, |
| 669 | else => |e| return e, |
| 638 | 670 | }, |
| 639 | 671 | } |
| 640 | | }, |
| 641 | | .finished => { |
| 642 | | if (handshake_state != .finished) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 643 | | // This message is to trick buggy proxies into behaving correctly. |
| 644 | | const client_change_cipher_spec_msg = [_]u8{ |
| 645 | | @intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.change_cipher_spec), |
| 646 | | 0x03, 0x03, // legacy protocol version |
| 647 | | 0x00, 0x01, // length |
| 648 | | 0x01, |
| 649 | | }; |
| 650 | | const app_cipher = switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 651 | | inline else => |*p, tag| c: { |
| 652 | | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 672 | |
| 673 | prev_cert = subject; |
| 674 | cert_index += 1; |
| 675 | } |
| 676 | cert_buf_index += 1; |
| 677 | }, |
| 678 | .server_key_exchange => { |
| 679 | if (tls_version != .tls_1_2) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 680 | if (cipher_state != .cleartext) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 681 | switch (handshake_state) { |
| 682 | .trust_chain_established => {}, |
| 683 | .certificate => return error.TlsCertificateNotVerified, |
| 684 | else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage, |
| 685 | } |
| 686 | |
| 687 | switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 688 | inline else => |*p| p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake), |
| 689 | } |
| 690 | try hsd.ensure(1 + 2 + 1); |
| 691 | const curve_type = hsd.decode(u8); |
| 692 | if (curve_type != 0x03) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; // named_curve |
| 693 | const named_group = hsd.decode(tls.NamedGroup); |
| 694 | const key_size = hsd.decode(u8); |
| 695 | try hsd.ensure(key_size); |
| 696 | const server_pub_key = hsd.slice(key_size); |
| 697 | try main_cert_pub_key.verifySignature(&hsd, &.{ &client_hello_rand, &server_hello_rand, hsd.buf[0..hsd.idx] }); |
| 698 | try key_share.exchange(named_group, server_pub_key); |
| 699 | handshake_state = .server_hello_done; |
| 700 | }, |
| 701 | .server_hello_done => { |
| 702 | if (tls_version != .tls_1_2) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 703 | if (cipher_state != .cleartext) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 704 | if (handshake_state != .server_hello_done) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 705 | |
| 706 | const client_key_exchange_msg = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake)} ++ |
| 707 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 708 | array(u16, u8, .{@intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.client_key_exchange)} ++ |
| 709 | array(u24, u8, array(u8, u8, key_share.secp256r1_kp.public_key.toUncompressedSec1()))); |
| 710 | const client_change_cipher_spec_msg = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.change_cipher_spec)} ++ |
| 711 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 712 | array(u16, tls.ChangeCipherSpecType, .{.change_cipher_spec}); |
| 713 | const pre_master_secret = key_share.getSharedSecret().?; |
| 714 | switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 715 | inline else => |*p| { |
| 716 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A; |
| 717 | p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake); |
| 718 | p.transcript_hash.update(client_key_exchange_msg[tls.record_header_len..]); |
| 719 | const master_secret = hmacExpandLabel(P.Hmac, pre_master_secret, &.{ |
| 720 | "master secret", |
| 721 | &client_hello_rand, |
| 722 | &server_hello_rand, |
| 723 | }, 48); |
| 724 | if (options.ssl_key_log_file) |key_log_file| logSecrets(key_log_file, .{ |
| 725 | .client_random = &client_hello_rand, |
| 726 | }, .{ |
| 727 | .CLIENT_RANDOM = &master_secret, |
| 728 | }); |
| 729 | const key_block = hmacExpandLabel( |
| 730 | P.Hmac, |
| 731 | &master_secret, |
| 732 | &.{ "key expansion", &server_hello_rand, &client_hello_rand }, |
| 733 | @sizeOf(P.Tls_1_2), |
| 734 | ); |
| 735 | const client_verify_cleartext = .{@intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.finished)} ++ |
| 736 | array(u24, u8, hmacExpandLabel( |
| 737 | P.Hmac, |
| 738 | &master_secret, |
| 739 | &.{ "client finished", &p.transcript_hash.peek() }, |
| 740 | P.verify_data_length, |
| 741 | )); |
| 742 | p.transcript_hash.update(&client_verify_cleartext); |
| 743 | p.version = .{ .tls_1_2 = .{ |
| 744 | .expected_server_verify_data = hmacExpandLabel( |
| 745 | P.Hmac, |
| 746 | &master_secret, |
| 747 | &.{ "server finished", &p.transcript_hash.finalResult() }, |
| 748 | P.verify_data_length, |
| 749 | ), |
| 750 | .app_cipher = std.mem.bytesToValue(P.Tls_1_2, &key_block), |
| 751 | } }; |
| 752 | const pv = &p.version.tls_1_2; |
| 753 | const nonce: [P.AEAD.nonce_length]u8 = if (builtin.zig_backend == .stage2_x86_64 and |
| 754 | P.AEAD.nonce_length > comptime std.simd.suggestVectorLength(u8) orelse 1) |
| 755 | nonce: { |
| 756 | var nonce = pv.app_cipher.client_write_IV ++ pv.app_cipher.client_salt; |
| 757 | const operand = std.mem.readInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], .big); |
| 758 | std.mem.writeInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], operand ^ write_seq, .big); |
| 759 | break :nonce nonce; |
| 760 | } else nonce: { |
| 761 | const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8); |
| 762 | const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8); |
| 763 | const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(write_seq))); |
| 764 | break :nonce @as(V, pv.app_cipher.client_write_IV ++ pv.app_cipher.client_salt) ^ operand; |
| 765 | }; |
| 766 | var client_verify_msg = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake)} ++ |
| 767 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 768 | array(u16, u8, nonce[P.fixed_iv_length..].* ++ |
| 769 | @as([client_verify_cleartext.len + P.mac_length]u8, undefined)); |
| 770 | P.AEAD.encrypt( |
| 771 | client_verify_msg[client_verify_msg.len - P.mac_length - |
| 772 | client_verify_cleartext.len ..][0..client_verify_cleartext.len], |
| 773 | client_verify_msg[client_verify_msg.len - P.mac_length ..][0..P.mac_length], |
| 774 | &client_verify_cleartext, |
| 775 | std.mem.toBytes(big(write_seq)) ++ client_verify_msg[0 .. 1 + 2] ++ int(u16, client_verify_cleartext.len), |
| 776 | nonce, |
| 777 | pv.app_cipher.client_write_key, |
| 778 | ); |
| 779 | const all_msgs = client_key_exchange_msg ++ client_change_cipher_spec_msg ++ client_verify_msg; |
| 780 | var all_msgs_vec = [_]std.posix.iovec_const{ |
| 781 | .{ .base = &all_msgs, .len = all_msgs.len }, |
| 782 | }; |
| 783 | try stream.writevAll(&all_msgs_vec); |
| 784 | }, |
| 785 | } |
| 786 | write_seq += 1; |
| 787 | pending_cipher_state = .application; |
| 788 | handshake_state = .finished; |
| 789 | }, |
| 790 | .certificate_verify => { |
| 791 | if (tls_version != .tls_1_3) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 792 | if (cipher_state != .handshake) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 793 | switch (handshake_state) { |
| 794 | .trust_chain_established => {}, |
| 795 | .certificate => return error.TlsCertificateNotVerified, |
| 796 | else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage, |
| 797 | } |
| 798 | switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 799 | inline else => |*p| { |
| 800 | try main_cert_pub_key.verifySignature(&hsd, &.{ |
| 801 | " " ** 64 ++ "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify\x00", |
| 802 | &p.transcript_hash.peek(), |
| 803 | }); |
| 804 | p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake); |
| 805 | }, |
| 806 | } |
| 807 | handshake_state = .finished; |
| 808 | }, |
| 809 | .finished => { |
| 810 | if (cipher_state == .cleartext) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 811 | if (handshake_state != .finished) return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 812 | // This message is to trick buggy proxies into behaving correctly. |
| 813 | const client_change_cipher_spec_msg = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.change_cipher_spec)} ++ |
| 814 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 815 | array(u16, tls.ChangeCipherSpecType, .{.change_cipher_spec}); |
| 816 | const app_cipher = app_cipher: switch (handshake_cipher) { |
| 817 | inline else => |*p, tag| switch (tls_version) { |
| 818 | .tls_1_3 => { |
| 819 | const pv = &p.version.tls_1_3; |
| 820 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A; |
| 821 | try hsd.ensure(P.Hmac.mac_length); |
| 653 | 822 | const finished_digest = p.transcript_hash.peek(); |
| 654 | 823 | p.transcript_hash.update(wrapped_handshake); |
| 655 | | const expected_server_verify_data = tls.hmac(P.Hmac, &finished_digest, p.server_finished_key); |
| 656 | | if (!mem.eql(u8, &expected_server_verify_data, handshake)) |
| 657 | | return error.TlsDecryptError; |
| 824 | const expected_server_verify_data = tls.hmac(P.Hmac, &finished_digest, pv.server_finished_key); |
| 825 | if (!std.crypto.timing_safe.eql([P.Hmac.mac_length]u8, expected_server_verify_data, hsd.array(P.Hmac.mac_length).*)) return error.TlsDecryptError; |
| 658 | 826 | const handshake_hash = p.transcript_hash.finalResult(); |
| 659 | | const verify_data = tls.hmac(P.Hmac, &handshake_hash, p.client_finished_key); |
| 660 | | const out_cleartext = [_]u8{ |
| 661 | | @intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.finished), |
| 662 | | 0, 0, verify_data.len, // length |
| 663 | | } ++ verify_data ++ [1]u8{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake)}; |
| 827 | const verify_data = tls.hmac(P.Hmac, &handshake_hash, pv.client_finished_key); |
| 828 | const out_cleartext = .{@intFromEnum(tls.HandshakeType.finished)} ++ |
| 829 | array(u24, u8, verify_data) ++ |
| 830 | .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.handshake)}; |
| 664 | 831 | |
| 665 | 832 | const wrapped_len = out_cleartext.len + P.AEAD.tag_length; |
| 666 | 833 | |
| 667 | | var finished_msg = [_]u8{ |
| 668 | | @intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.application_data), |
| 669 | | 0x03, 0x03, // legacy protocol version |
| 670 | | 0, wrapped_len, // byte length of encrypted record |
| 671 | | } ++ @as([wrapped_len]u8, undefined); |
| 834 | var finished_msg = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.application_data)} ++ |
| 835 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 836 | array(u16, u8, @as([wrapped_len]u8, undefined)); |
| 672 | 837 | |
| 673 | | const ad = finished_msg[0..5]; |
| 674 | | const ciphertext = finished_msg[5..][0..out_cleartext.len]; |
| 838 | const ad = finished_msg[0..tls.record_header_len]; |
| 839 | const ciphertext = finished_msg[tls.record_header_len..][0..out_cleartext.len]; |
| 675 | 840 | const auth_tag = finished_msg[finished_msg.len - P.AEAD.tag_length ..]; |
| 676 | | const nonce = p.client_handshake_iv; |
| 677 | | P.AEAD.encrypt(ciphertext, auth_tag, &out_cleartext, ad, nonce, p.client_handshake_key); |
| 678 | | |
| 679 | | const both_msgs = client_change_cipher_spec_msg ++ finished_msg; |
| 680 | | var both_msgs_vec = [_]std.posix.iovec_const{.{ |
| 681 | | .base = &both_msgs, |
| 682 | | .len = both_msgs.len, |
| 683 | | }}; |
| 684 | | try stream.writevAll(&both_msgs_vec); |
| 685 | | |
| 686 | | const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.master_secret, "c ap traffic", &handshake_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 687 | | const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.master_secret, "s ap traffic", &handshake_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 688 | | break :c @unionInit(tls.ApplicationCipher, @tagName(tag), .{ |
| 841 | const nonce = pv.client_handshake_iv; |
| 842 | P.AEAD.encrypt(ciphertext, auth_tag, &out_cleartext, ad, nonce, pv.client_handshake_key); |
| 843 | |
| 844 | const all_msgs = client_change_cipher_spec_msg ++ finished_msg; |
| 845 | var all_msgs_vec = [_]std.posix.iovec_const{ |
| 846 | .{ .base = &all_msgs, .len = all_msgs.len }, |
| 847 | }; |
| 848 | try stream.writevAll(&all_msgs_vec); |
| 849 | |
| 850 | const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.master_secret, "c ap traffic", &handshake_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 851 | const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.master_secret, "s ap traffic", &handshake_hash, P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 852 | if (options.ssl_key_log_file) |key_log_file| logSecrets(key_log_file, .{ |
| 853 | .counter = key_seq, |
| 854 | .client_random = &client_hello_rand, |
| 855 | }, .{ |
| 856 | .SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &server_secret, |
| 857 | .CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &client_secret, |
| 858 | }); |
| 859 | key_seq += 1; |
| 860 | break :app_cipher @unionInit(tls.ApplicationCipher, @tagName(tag), .{ .tls_1_3 = .{ |
| 689 | 861 | .client_secret = client_secret, |
| 690 | 862 | .server_secret = server_secret, |
| 691 | 863 | .client_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length), |
| 692 | 864 | .server_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length), |
| 693 | 865 | .client_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length), |
| 694 | 866 | .server_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length), |
| 695 | | }); |
| 867 | } }); |
| 696 | 868 | }, |
| 697 | | }; |
| 698 | | const leftover = d.rest(); |
| 699 | | var client: Client = .{ |
| 700 | | .read_seq = 0, |
| 701 | | .write_seq = 0, |
| 702 | | .partial_cleartext_idx = 0, |
| 703 | | .partial_ciphertext_idx = 0, |
| 704 | | .partial_ciphertext_end = @intCast(leftover.len), |
| 705 | | .received_close_notify = false, |
| 706 | | .application_cipher = app_cipher, |
| 707 | | .partially_read_buffer = undefined, |
| 708 | | }; |
| 709 | | @memcpy(client.partially_read_buffer[0..leftover.len], leftover); |
| 710 | | return client; |
| 711 | | }, |
| 712 | | else => { |
| 713 | | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 714 | | }, |
| 715 | | } |
| 716 | | if (ctd.eof()) break; |
| 869 | .tls_1_2 => { |
| 870 | const pv = &p.version.tls_1_2; |
| 871 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*).A; |
| 872 | try hsd.ensure(P.verify_data_length); |
| 873 | if (!std.crypto.timing_safe.eql([P.verify_data_length]u8, pv.expected_server_verify_data, hsd.array(P.verify_data_length).*)) return error.TlsDecryptError; |
| 874 | break :app_cipher @unionInit(tls.ApplicationCipher, @tagName(tag), .{ .tls_1_2 = pv.app_cipher }); |
| 875 | }, |
| 876 | else => unreachable, |
| 877 | }, |
| 878 | }; |
| 879 | const leftover = d.rest(); |
| 880 | var client: Client = .{ |
| 881 | .tls_version = tls_version, |
| 882 | .read_seq = switch (tls_version) { |
| 883 | .tls_1_3 => 0, |
| 884 | .tls_1_2 => read_seq, |
| 885 | else => unreachable, |
| 886 | }, |
| 887 | .write_seq = switch (tls_version) { |
| 888 | .tls_1_3 => 0, |
| 889 | .tls_1_2 => write_seq, |
| 890 | else => unreachable, |
| 891 | }, |
| 892 | .partial_cleartext_idx = 0, |
| 893 | .partial_ciphertext_idx = 0, |
| 894 | .partial_ciphertext_end = @intCast(leftover.len), |
| 895 | .received_close_notify = false, |
| 896 | .allow_truncation_attacks = false, |
| 897 | .application_cipher = app_cipher, |
| 898 | .partially_read_buffer = undefined, |
| 899 | .ssl_key_log = if (options.ssl_key_log_file) |key_log_file| .{ |
| 900 | .client_key_seq = key_seq, |
| 901 | .server_key_seq = key_seq, |
| 902 | .client_random = client_hello_rand, |
| 903 | .file = key_log_file, |
| 904 | } else null, |
| 905 | }; |
| 906 | @memcpy(client.partially_read_buffer[0..leftover.len], leftover); |
| 907 | return client; |
| 908 | }, |
| 909 | else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage, |
| 717 | 910 | } |
| 911 | if (ctd.eof()) break; |
| 912 | cleartext_fragment_start = ctd.idx; |
| 718 | 913 | }, |
| 719 | | else => { |
| 720 | | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 721 | | }, |
| 914 | else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage, |
| 722 | 915 | } |
| 916 | cleartext_fragment_start = 0; |
| 917 | cleartext_fragment_end = 0; |
| 723 | 918 | } |
| 724 | 919 | } |
| 725 | 920 | |
| 726 | 921 | /// Sends TLS-encrypted data to `stream`, which must conform to `StreamInterface`. |
| 727 | | /// Returns the number of plaintext bytes sent, which may be fewer than `bytes.len`. |
| 922 | /// Returns the number of cleartext bytes sent, which may be fewer than `bytes.len`. |
| 728 | 923 | pub fn write(c: *Client, stream: anytype, bytes: []const u8) !usize { |
| 729 | 924 | return writeEnd(c, stream, bytes, false); |
| 730 | 925 | } |
| ... | ... | @@ -749,7 +944,7 @@ pub fn writeAllEnd(c: *Client, stream: anytype, bytes: []const u8, end: bool) !v |
| 749 | 944 | } |
| 750 | 945 | |
| 751 | 946 | /// Sends TLS-encrypted data to `stream`, which must conform to `StreamInterface`. |
| 752 | | /// Returns the number of plaintext bytes sent, which may be fewer than `bytes.len`. |
| 947 | /// Returns the number of cleartext bytes sent, which may be fewer than `bytes.len`. |
| 753 | 948 | /// If `end` is true, then this function additionally sends a `close_notify` alert, |
| 754 | 949 | /// which is necessary for the server to distinguish between a properly finished |
| 755 | 950 | /// TLS session, or a truncation attack. |
| ... | ... | @@ -813,62 +1008,126 @@ fn prepareCiphertextRecord( |
| 813 | 1008 | var iovec_end: usize = 0; |
| 814 | 1009 | var bytes_i: usize = 0; |
| 815 | 1010 | switch (c.application_cipher) { |
| 816 | | inline else => |*p| { |
| 817 | | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 818 | | const overhead_len = tls.record_header_len + P.AEAD.tag_length + 1; |
| 819 | | const close_notify_alert_reserved = tls.close_notify_alert.len + overhead_len; |
| 820 | | while (true) { |
| 821 | | const encrypted_content_len: u16 = @intCast(@min( |
| 822 | | @min(bytes.len - bytes_i, tls.max_ciphertext_inner_record_len), |
| 823 | | ciphertext_buf.len -| |
| 824 | | (close_notify_alert_reserved + overhead_len + ciphertext_end), |
| 825 | | )); |
| 826 | | if (encrypted_content_len == 0) return .{ |
| 827 | | .iovec_end = iovec_end, |
| 828 | | .ciphertext_end = ciphertext_end, |
| 829 | | .overhead_len = overhead_len, |
| 830 | | }; |
| 831 | | |
| 832 | | @memcpy(cleartext_buf[0..encrypted_content_len], bytes[bytes_i..][0..encrypted_content_len]); |
| 833 | | cleartext_buf[encrypted_content_len] = @intFromEnum(inner_content_type); |
| 834 | | bytes_i += encrypted_content_len; |
| 835 | | const ciphertext_len = encrypted_content_len + 1; |
| 836 | | const cleartext = cleartext_buf[0..ciphertext_len]; |
| 837 | | |
| 838 | | const record_start = ciphertext_end; |
| 839 | | const ad = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..5]; |
| 840 | | ad.* = |
| 841 | | [_]u8{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.application_data)} ++ |
| 842 | | int2(@intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 843 | | int2(ciphertext_len + P.AEAD.tag_length); |
| 844 | | ciphertext_end += ad.len; |
| 845 | | const ciphertext = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..ciphertext_len]; |
| 846 | | ciphertext_end += ciphertext_len; |
| 847 | | const auth_tag = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..P.AEAD.tag_length]; |
| 848 | | ciphertext_end += auth_tag.len; |
| 849 | | const nonce = if (builtin.zig_backend == .stage2_x86_64 and |
| 850 | | P.AEAD.nonce_length > comptime std.simd.suggestVectorLength(u8) orelse 1) |
| 851 | | nonce: { |
| 852 | | var nonce = p.client_iv; |
| 853 | | const operand = std.mem.readInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], .big); |
| 854 | | std.mem.writeInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], operand ^ c.write_seq, .big); |
| 855 | | break :nonce nonce; |
| 856 | | } else nonce: { |
| 857 | | const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8); |
| 858 | | const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8); |
| 859 | | const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(c.write_seq))); |
| 860 | | break :nonce @as(V, p.client_iv) ^ operand; |
| 861 | | }; |
| 862 | | c.write_seq += 1; // TODO send key_update on overflow |
| 863 | | P.AEAD.encrypt(ciphertext, auth_tag, cleartext, ad, nonce, p.client_key); |
| 864 | | |
| 865 | | const record = ciphertext_buf[record_start..ciphertext_end]; |
| 866 | | iovecs[iovec_end] = .{ |
| 867 | | .base = record.ptr, |
| 868 | | .len = record.len, |
| 869 | | }; |
| 870 | | iovec_end += 1; |
| 871 | | } |
| 1011 | inline else => |*p| switch (c.tls_version) { |
| 1012 | .tls_1_3 => { |
| 1013 | const pv = &p.tls_1_3; |
| 1014 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 1015 | const overhead_len = tls.record_header_len + P.AEAD.tag_length + 1; |
| 1016 | const close_notify_alert_reserved = tls.close_notify_alert.len + overhead_len; |
| 1017 | while (true) { |
| 1018 | const encrypted_content_len: u16 = @min( |
| 1019 | bytes.len - bytes_i, |
| 1020 | tls.max_ciphertext_inner_record_len, |
| 1021 | ciphertext_buf.len -| |
| 1022 | (close_notify_alert_reserved + overhead_len + ciphertext_end), |
| 1023 | ); |
| 1024 | if (encrypted_content_len == 0) return .{ |
| 1025 | .iovec_end = iovec_end, |
| 1026 | .ciphertext_end = ciphertext_end, |
| 1027 | .overhead_len = overhead_len, |
| 1028 | }; |
| 1029 | |
| 1030 | @memcpy(cleartext_buf[0..encrypted_content_len], bytes[bytes_i..][0..encrypted_content_len]); |
| 1031 | cleartext_buf[encrypted_content_len] = @intFromEnum(inner_content_type); |
| 1032 | bytes_i += encrypted_content_len; |
| 1033 | const ciphertext_len = encrypted_content_len + 1; |
| 1034 | const cleartext = cleartext_buf[0..ciphertext_len]; |
| 1035 | |
| 1036 | const record_start = ciphertext_end; |
| 1037 | const ad = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..tls.record_header_len]; |
| 1038 | ad.* = .{@intFromEnum(tls.ContentType.application_data)} ++ |
| 1039 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 1040 | int(u16, ciphertext_len + P.AEAD.tag_length); |
| 1041 | ciphertext_end += ad.len; |
| 1042 | const ciphertext = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..ciphertext_len]; |
| 1043 | ciphertext_end += ciphertext_len; |
| 1044 | const auth_tag = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..P.AEAD.tag_length]; |
| 1045 | ciphertext_end += auth_tag.len; |
| 1046 | const nonce = if (builtin.zig_backend == .stage2_x86_64 and |
| 1047 | P.AEAD.nonce_length > comptime std.simd.suggestVectorLength(u8) orelse 1) |
| 1048 | nonce: { |
| 1049 | var nonce = pv.client_iv; |
| 1050 | const operand = std.mem.readInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], .big); |
| 1051 | std.mem.writeInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], operand ^ c.write_seq, .big); |
| 1052 | break :nonce nonce; |
| 1053 | } else nonce: { |
| 1054 | const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8); |
| 1055 | const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8); |
| 1056 | const operand: V = pad ++ std.mem.toBytes(big(c.write_seq)); |
| 1057 | break :nonce @as(V, pv.client_iv) ^ operand; |
| 1058 | }; |
| 1059 | P.AEAD.encrypt(ciphertext, auth_tag, cleartext, ad, nonce, pv.client_key); |
| 1060 | c.write_seq += 1; // TODO send key_update on overflow |
| 1061 | |
| 1062 | const record = ciphertext_buf[record_start..ciphertext_end]; |
| 1063 | iovecs[iovec_end] = .{ |
| 1064 | .base = record.ptr, |
| 1065 | .len = record.len, |
| 1066 | }; |
| 1067 | iovec_end += 1; |
| 1068 | } |
| 1069 | }, |
| 1070 | .tls_1_2 => { |
| 1071 | const pv = &p.tls_1_2; |
| 1072 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 1073 | const overhead_len = tls.record_header_len + P.record_iv_length + P.mac_length; |
| 1074 | const close_notify_alert_reserved = tls.close_notify_alert.len + overhead_len; |
| 1075 | while (true) { |
| 1076 | const message_len: u16 = @min( |
| 1077 | bytes.len - bytes_i, |
| 1078 | tls.max_ciphertext_inner_record_len, |
| 1079 | ciphertext_buf.len -| |
| 1080 | (close_notify_alert_reserved + overhead_len + ciphertext_end), |
| 1081 | ); |
| 1082 | if (message_len == 0) return .{ |
| 1083 | .iovec_end = iovec_end, |
| 1084 | .ciphertext_end = ciphertext_end, |
| 1085 | .overhead_len = overhead_len, |
| 1086 | }; |
| 1087 | |
| 1088 | @memcpy(cleartext_buf[0..message_len], bytes[bytes_i..][0..message_len]); |
| 1089 | bytes_i += message_len; |
| 1090 | const cleartext = cleartext_buf[0..message_len]; |
| 1091 | |
| 1092 | const record_start = ciphertext_end; |
| 1093 | const record_header = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..tls.record_header_len]; |
| 1094 | ciphertext_end += tls.record_header_len; |
| 1095 | record_header.* = .{@intFromEnum(inner_content_type)} ++ |
| 1096 | int(u16, @intFromEnum(tls.ProtocolVersion.tls_1_2)) ++ |
| 1097 | int(u16, P.record_iv_length + message_len + P.mac_length); |
| 1098 | const ad = std.mem.toBytes(big(c.write_seq)) ++ record_header[0 .. 1 + 2] ++ int(u16, message_len); |
| 1099 | const record_iv = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..P.record_iv_length]; |
| 1100 | ciphertext_end += P.record_iv_length; |
| 1101 | const nonce: [P.AEAD.nonce_length]u8 = if (builtin.zig_backend == .stage2_x86_64 and |
| 1102 | P.AEAD.nonce_length > comptime std.simd.suggestVectorLength(u8) orelse 1) |
| 1103 | nonce: { |
| 1104 | var nonce = pv.client_write_IV ++ pv.client_salt; |
| 1105 | const operand = std.mem.readInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], .big); |
| 1106 | std.mem.writeInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], operand ^ c.write_seq, .big); |
| 1107 | break :nonce nonce; |
| 1108 | } else nonce: { |
| 1109 | const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8); |
| 1110 | const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8); |
| 1111 | const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(c.write_seq))); |
| 1112 | break :nonce @as(V, pv.client_write_IV ++ pv.client_salt) ^ operand; |
| 1113 | }; |
| 1114 | record_iv.* = nonce[P.fixed_iv_length..].*; |
| 1115 | const ciphertext = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..message_len]; |
| 1116 | ciphertext_end += message_len; |
| 1117 | const auth_tag = ciphertext_buf[ciphertext_end..][0..P.mac_length]; |
| 1118 | ciphertext_end += P.mac_length; |
| 1119 | P.AEAD.encrypt(ciphertext, auth_tag, cleartext, ad, nonce, pv.client_write_key); |
| 1120 | c.write_seq += 1; // TODO send key_update on overflow |
| 1121 | |
| 1122 | const record = ciphertext_buf[record_start..ciphertext_end]; |
| 1123 | iovecs[iovec_end] = .{ |
| 1124 | .base = record.ptr, |
| 1125 | .len = record.len, |
| 1126 | }; |
| 1127 | iovec_end += 1; |
| 1128 | } |
| 1129 | }, |
| 1130 | else => unreachable, |
| 872 | 1131 | }, |
| 873 | 1132 | } |
| 874 | 1133 | } |
| ... | ... | @@ -990,7 +1249,7 @@ pub fn readvAdvanced(c: *Client, stream: anytype, iovecs: []const std.posix.iove |
| 990 | 1249 | // beginning of the buffer will be used for such purposes. |
| 991 | 1250 | const cleartext_buf_len = free_size - ciphertext_buf_len; |
| 992 | 1251 | |
| 993 | | // Recoup `partially_read_buffer space`. This is necessary because it is assumed |
| 1252 | // Recoup `partially_read_buffer` space. This is necessary because it is assumed |
| 994 | 1253 | // below that `frag0` is big enough to hold at least one record. |
| 995 | 1254 | limitedOverlapCopy(c.partially_read_buffer[0..c.partial_ciphertext_end], c.partial_ciphertext_idx); |
| 996 | 1255 | c.partial_ciphertext_end -= c.partial_ciphertext_idx; |
| ... | ... | @@ -1105,164 +1364,211 @@ pub fn readvAdvanced(c: *Client, stream: anytype, iovecs: []const std.posix.iove |
| 1105 | 1364 | in = 0; |
| 1106 | 1365 | continue; |
| 1107 | 1366 | } |
| 1108 | | switch (ct) { |
| 1367 | const cleartext, const inner_ct: tls.ContentType = cleartext: switch (c.application_cipher) { |
| 1368 | inline else => |*p| switch (c.tls_version) { |
| 1369 | .tls_1_3 => { |
| 1370 | const pv = &p.tls_1_3; |
| 1371 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 1372 | const ad = frag[in - tls.record_header_len ..][0..tls.record_header_len]; |
| 1373 | const ciphertext_len = record_len - P.AEAD.tag_length; |
| 1374 | const ciphertext = frag[in..][0..ciphertext_len]; |
| 1375 | in += ciphertext_len; |
| 1376 | const auth_tag = frag[in..][0..P.AEAD.tag_length].*; |
| 1377 | const nonce = if (builtin.zig_backend == .stage2_x86_64 and |
| 1378 | P.AEAD.nonce_length > comptime std.simd.suggestVectorLength(u8) orelse 1) |
| 1379 | nonce: { |
| 1380 | var nonce = pv.server_iv; |
| 1381 | const operand = std.mem.readInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], .big); |
| 1382 | std.mem.writeInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], operand ^ c.read_seq, .big); |
| 1383 | break :nonce nonce; |
| 1384 | } else nonce: { |
| 1385 | const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8); |
| 1386 | const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8); |
| 1387 | const operand: V = pad ++ std.mem.toBytes(big(c.read_seq)); |
| 1388 | break :nonce @as(V, pv.server_iv) ^ operand; |
| 1389 | }; |
| 1390 | const out_buf = vp.peek(); |
| 1391 | const cleartext_buf = if (ciphertext.len <= out_buf.len) |
| 1392 | out_buf |
| 1393 | else |
| 1394 | &cleartext_stack_buffer; |
| 1395 | const cleartext = cleartext_buf[0..ciphertext.len]; |
| 1396 | P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag, ad, nonce, pv.server_key) catch |
| 1397 | return error.TlsBadRecordMac; |
| 1398 | const msg = mem.trimRight(u8, cleartext, "\x00"); |
| 1399 | break :cleartext .{ msg[0 .. msg.len - 1], @enumFromInt(msg[msg.len - 1]) }; |
| 1400 | }, |
| 1401 | .tls_1_2 => { |
| 1402 | const pv = &p.tls_1_2; |
| 1403 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 1404 | const message_len: u16 = record_len - P.record_iv_length - P.mac_length; |
| 1405 | const ad = std.mem.toBytes(big(c.read_seq)) ++ |
| 1406 | frag[in - tls.record_header_len ..][0 .. 1 + 2] ++ |
| 1407 | std.mem.toBytes(big(message_len)); |
| 1408 | const record_iv = frag[in..][0..P.record_iv_length].*; |
| 1409 | in += P.record_iv_length; |
| 1410 | const masked_read_seq = c.read_seq & |
| 1411 | comptime std.math.shl(u64, std.math.maxInt(u64), 8 * P.record_iv_length); |
| 1412 | const nonce: [P.AEAD.nonce_length]u8 = if (builtin.zig_backend == .stage2_x86_64 and |
| 1413 | P.AEAD.nonce_length > comptime std.simd.suggestVectorLength(u8) orelse 1) |
| 1414 | nonce: { |
| 1415 | var nonce = pv.server_write_IV ++ record_iv; |
| 1416 | const operand = std.mem.readInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], .big); |
| 1417 | std.mem.writeInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], operand ^ masked_read_seq, .big); |
| 1418 | break :nonce nonce; |
| 1419 | } else nonce: { |
| 1420 | const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8); |
| 1421 | const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8); |
| 1422 | const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(masked_read_seq))); |
| 1423 | break :nonce @as(V, pv.server_write_IV ++ record_iv) ^ operand; |
| 1424 | }; |
| 1425 | const ciphertext = frag[in..][0..message_len]; |
| 1426 | in += message_len; |
| 1427 | const auth_tag = frag[in..][0..P.mac_length].*; |
| 1428 | in += P.mac_length; |
| 1429 | const out_buf = vp.peek(); |
| 1430 | const cleartext_buf = if (message_len <= out_buf.len) |
| 1431 | out_buf |
| 1432 | else |
| 1433 | &cleartext_stack_buffer; |
| 1434 | const cleartext = cleartext_buf[0..ciphertext.len]; |
| 1435 | P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag, ad, nonce, pv.server_write_key) catch |
| 1436 | return error.TlsBadRecordMac; |
| 1437 | break :cleartext .{ cleartext, ct }; |
| 1438 | }, |
| 1439 | else => unreachable, |
| 1440 | }, |
| 1441 | }; |
| 1442 | c.read_seq = try std.math.add(u64, c.read_seq, 1); |
| 1443 | switch (inner_ct) { |
| 1109 | 1444 | .alert => { |
| 1110 | | if (in + 2 > frag.len) return error.TlsDecodeError; |
| 1111 | | const level: tls.AlertLevel = @enumFromInt(frag[in]); |
| 1112 | | const desc: tls.AlertDescription = @enumFromInt(frag[in + 1]); |
| 1445 | if (cleartext.len != 2) return error.TlsDecodeError; |
| 1446 | const level: tls.AlertLevel = @enumFromInt(cleartext[0]); |
| 1447 | const desc: tls.AlertDescription = @enumFromInt(cleartext[1]); |
| 1448 | if (desc == .close_notify) { |
| 1449 | c.received_close_notify = true; |
| 1450 | c.partial_ciphertext_end = c.partial_ciphertext_idx; |
| 1451 | return vp.total; |
| 1452 | } |
| 1113 | 1453 | _ = level; |
| 1114 | 1454 | |
| 1115 | 1455 | try desc.toError(); |
| 1116 | 1456 | // TODO: handle server-side closures |
| 1117 | 1457 | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 1118 | 1458 | }, |
| 1119 | | .application_data => { |
| 1120 | | const cleartext = switch (c.application_cipher) { |
| 1121 | | inline else => |*p| c: { |
| 1122 | | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 1123 | | const ad = frag[in - 5 ..][0..5]; |
| 1124 | | const ciphertext_len = record_len - P.AEAD.tag_length; |
| 1125 | | const ciphertext = frag[in..][0..ciphertext_len]; |
| 1126 | | in += ciphertext_len; |
| 1127 | | const auth_tag = frag[in..][0..P.AEAD.tag_length].*; |
| 1128 | | const nonce = if (builtin.zig_backend == .stage2_x86_64 and |
| 1129 | | P.AEAD.nonce_length > comptime std.simd.suggestVectorLength(u8) orelse 1) |
| 1130 | | nonce: { |
| 1131 | | var nonce = p.server_iv; |
| 1132 | | const operand = std.mem.readInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], .big); |
| 1133 | | std.mem.writeInt(u64, nonce[nonce.len - 8 ..], operand ^ c.read_seq, .big); |
| 1134 | | break :nonce nonce; |
| 1135 | | } else nonce: { |
| 1136 | | const V = @Vector(P.AEAD.nonce_length, u8); |
| 1137 | | const pad = [1]u8{0} ** (P.AEAD.nonce_length - 8); |
| 1138 | | const operand: V = pad ++ @as([8]u8, @bitCast(big(c.read_seq))); |
| 1139 | | break :nonce @as(V, p.server_iv) ^ operand; |
| 1140 | | }; |
| 1141 | | const out_buf = vp.peek(); |
| 1142 | | const cleartext_buf = if (ciphertext.len <= out_buf.len) |
| 1143 | | out_buf |
| 1144 | | else |
| 1145 | | &cleartext_stack_buffer; |
| 1146 | | const cleartext = cleartext_buf[0..ciphertext.len]; |
| 1147 | | P.AEAD.decrypt(cleartext, ciphertext, auth_tag, ad, nonce, p.server_key) catch |
| 1148 | | return error.TlsBadRecordMac; |
| 1149 | | break :c mem.trimRight(u8, cleartext, "\x00"); |
| 1150 | | }, |
| 1151 | | }; |
| 1152 | | |
| 1153 | | c.read_seq = try std.math.add(u64, c.read_seq, 1); |
| 1154 | | |
| 1155 | | const inner_ct: tls.ContentType = @enumFromInt(cleartext[cleartext.len - 1]); |
| 1156 | | switch (inner_ct) { |
| 1157 | | .alert => { |
| 1158 | | const level: tls.AlertLevel = @enumFromInt(cleartext[0]); |
| 1159 | | const desc: tls.AlertDescription = @enumFromInt(cleartext[1]); |
| 1160 | | if (desc == .close_notify) { |
| 1161 | | c.received_close_notify = true; |
| 1162 | | c.partial_ciphertext_end = c.partial_ciphertext_idx; |
| 1163 | | return vp.total; |
| 1164 | | } |
| 1165 | | _ = level; |
| 1166 | | |
| 1167 | | try desc.toError(); |
| 1168 | | // TODO: handle server-side closures |
| 1169 | | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 1170 | | }, |
| 1171 | | .handshake => { |
| 1172 | | var ct_i: usize = 0; |
| 1173 | | while (true) { |
| 1174 | | const handshake_type: tls.HandshakeType = @enumFromInt(cleartext[ct_i]); |
| 1175 | | ct_i += 1; |
| 1176 | | const handshake_len = mem.readInt(u24, cleartext[ct_i..][0..3], .big); |
| 1177 | | ct_i += 3; |
| 1178 | | const next_handshake_i = ct_i + handshake_len; |
| 1179 | | if (next_handshake_i > cleartext.len - 1) |
| 1180 | | return error.TlsBadLength; |
| 1181 | | const handshake = cleartext[ct_i..next_handshake_i]; |
| 1182 | | switch (handshake_type) { |
| 1183 | | .new_session_ticket => { |
| 1184 | | // This client implementation ignores new session tickets. |
| 1459 | .handshake => { |
| 1460 | var ct_i: usize = 0; |
| 1461 | while (true) { |
| 1462 | const handshake_type: tls.HandshakeType = @enumFromInt(cleartext[ct_i]); |
| 1463 | ct_i += 1; |
| 1464 | const handshake_len = mem.readInt(u24, cleartext[ct_i..][0..3], .big); |
| 1465 | ct_i += 3; |
| 1466 | const next_handshake_i = ct_i + handshake_len; |
| 1467 | if (next_handshake_i > cleartext.len) |
| 1468 | return error.TlsBadLength; |
| 1469 | const handshake = cleartext[ct_i..next_handshake_i]; |
| 1470 | switch (handshake_type) { |
| 1471 | .new_session_ticket => { |
| 1472 | // This client implementation ignores new session tickets. |
| 1473 | }, |
| 1474 | .key_update => { |
| 1475 | switch (c.application_cipher) { |
| 1476 | inline else => |*p| { |
| 1477 | const pv = &p.tls_1_3; |
| 1478 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 1479 | const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.server_secret, "traffic upd", "", P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 1480 | if (c.ssl_key_log) |*key_log| logSecrets(key_log.file, .{ |
| 1481 | .counter = key_log.serverCounter(), |
| 1482 | .client_random = &key_log.client_random, |
| 1483 | }, .{ |
| 1484 | .SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &server_secret, |
| 1485 | }); |
| 1486 | pv.server_secret = server_secret; |
| 1487 | pv.server_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length); |
| 1488 | pv.server_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length); |
| 1185 | 1489 | }, |
| 1186 | | .key_update => { |
| 1490 | } |
| 1491 | c.read_seq = 0; |
| 1492 | |
| 1493 | switch (@as(tls.KeyUpdateRequest, @enumFromInt(handshake[0]))) { |
| 1494 | .update_requested => { |
| 1187 | 1495 | switch (c.application_cipher) { |
| 1188 | 1496 | inline else => |*p| { |
| 1497 | const pv = &p.tls_1_3; |
| 1189 | 1498 | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 1190 | | const server_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.server_secret, "traffic upd", "", P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 1191 | | p.server_secret = server_secret; |
| 1192 | | p.server_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length); |
| 1193 | | p.server_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, server_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length); |
| 1499 | const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, pv.client_secret, "traffic upd", "", P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 1500 | if (c.ssl_key_log) |*key_log| logSecrets(key_log.file, .{ |
| 1501 | .counter = key_log.clientCounter(), |
| 1502 | .client_random = &key_log.client_random, |
| 1503 | }, .{ |
| 1504 | .CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET = &client_secret, |
| 1505 | }); |
| 1506 | pv.client_secret = client_secret; |
| 1507 | pv.client_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length); |
| 1508 | pv.client_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length); |
| 1194 | 1509 | }, |
| 1195 | 1510 | } |
| 1196 | | c.read_seq = 0; |
| 1197 | | |
| 1198 | | switch (@as(tls.KeyUpdateRequest, @enumFromInt(handshake[0]))) { |
| 1199 | | .update_requested => { |
| 1200 | | switch (c.application_cipher) { |
| 1201 | | inline else => |*p| { |
| 1202 | | const P = @TypeOf(p.*); |
| 1203 | | const client_secret = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, p.client_secret, "traffic upd", "", P.Hash.digest_length); |
| 1204 | | p.client_secret = client_secret; |
| 1205 | | p.client_key = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "key", "", P.AEAD.key_length); |
| 1206 | | p.client_iv = hkdfExpandLabel(P.Hkdf, client_secret, "iv", "", P.AEAD.nonce_length); |
| 1207 | | }, |
| 1208 | | } |
| 1209 | | c.write_seq = 0; |
| 1210 | | }, |
| 1211 | | .update_not_requested => {}, |
| 1212 | | _ => return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 1213 | | } |
| 1214 | | }, |
| 1215 | | else => { |
| 1216 | | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 1511 | c.write_seq = 0; |
| 1217 | 1512 | }, |
| 1513 | .update_not_requested => {}, |
| 1514 | _ => return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 1218 | 1515 | } |
| 1219 | | ct_i = next_handshake_i; |
| 1220 | | if (ct_i >= cleartext.len - 1) break; |
| 1221 | | } |
| 1222 | | }, |
| 1223 | | .application_data => { |
| 1224 | | // Determine whether the output buffer or a stack |
| 1225 | | // buffer was used for storing the cleartext. |
| 1226 | | if (cleartext.ptr == &cleartext_stack_buffer) { |
| 1227 | | // Stack buffer was used, so we must copy to the output buffer. |
| 1228 | | const msg = cleartext[0 .. cleartext.len - 1]; |
| 1229 | | if (c.partial_ciphertext_idx > c.partial_cleartext_idx) { |
| 1230 | | // We have already run out of room in iovecs. Continue |
| 1231 | | // appending to `partially_read_buffer`. |
| 1232 | | @memcpy( |
| 1233 | | c.partially_read_buffer[c.partial_ciphertext_idx..][0..msg.len], |
| 1234 | | msg, |
| 1235 | | ); |
| 1236 | | c.partial_ciphertext_idx = @intCast(c.partial_ciphertext_idx + msg.len); |
| 1237 | | } else { |
| 1238 | | const amt = vp.put(msg); |
| 1239 | | if (amt < msg.len) { |
| 1240 | | const rest = msg[amt..]; |
| 1241 | | c.partial_cleartext_idx = 0; |
| 1242 | | c.partial_ciphertext_idx = @intCast(rest.len); |
| 1243 | | @memcpy(c.partially_read_buffer[0..rest.len], rest); |
| 1244 | | } |
| 1245 | | } |
| 1246 | | } else { |
| 1247 | | // Output buffer was used directly which means no |
| 1248 | | // memory copying needs to occur, and we can move |
| 1249 | | // on to the next ciphertext record. |
| 1250 | | vp.next(cleartext.len - 1); |
| 1251 | | } |
| 1252 | | }, |
| 1253 | | else => { |
| 1254 | | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 1255 | | }, |
| 1516 | }, |
| 1517 | else => { |
| 1518 | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 1519 | }, |
| 1520 | } |
| 1521 | ct_i = next_handshake_i; |
| 1522 | if (ct_i >= cleartext.len) break; |
| 1256 | 1523 | } |
| 1257 | 1524 | }, |
| 1258 | | else => { |
| 1259 | | return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage; |
| 1525 | .application_data => { |
| 1526 | // Determine whether the output buffer or a stack |
| 1527 | // buffer was used for storing the cleartext. |
| 1528 | if (cleartext.ptr == &cleartext_stack_buffer) { |
| 1529 | // Stack buffer was used, so we must copy to the output buffer. |
| 1530 | if (c.partial_ciphertext_idx > c.partial_cleartext_idx) { |
| 1531 | // We have already run out of room in iovecs. Continue |
| 1532 | // appending to `partially_read_buffer`. |
| 1533 | @memcpy( |
| 1534 | c.partially_read_buffer[c.partial_ciphertext_idx..][0..cleartext.len], |
| 1535 | cleartext, |
| 1536 | ); |
| 1537 | c.partial_ciphertext_idx = @intCast(c.partial_ciphertext_idx + cleartext.len); |
| 1538 | } else { |
| 1539 | const amt = vp.put(cleartext); |
| 1540 | if (amt < cleartext.len) { |
| 1541 | const rest = cleartext[amt..]; |
| 1542 | c.partial_cleartext_idx = 0; |
| 1543 | c.partial_ciphertext_idx = @intCast(rest.len); |
| 1544 | @memcpy(c.partially_read_buffer[0..rest.len], rest); |
| 1545 | } |
| 1546 | } |
| 1547 | } else { |
| 1548 | // Output buffer was used directly which means no |
| 1549 | // memory copying needs to occur, and we can move |
| 1550 | // on to the next ciphertext record. |
| 1551 | vp.next(cleartext.len); |
| 1552 | } |
| 1260 | 1553 | }, |
| 1554 | else => return error.TlsUnexpectedMessage, |
| 1261 | 1555 | } |
| 1262 | 1556 | in = end; |
| 1263 | 1557 | } |
| 1264 | 1558 | } |
| 1265 | 1559 | |
| 1560 | fn logSecrets(key_log_file: std.fs.File, context: anytype, secrets: anytype) void { |
| 1561 | const locked = if (key_log_file.lock(.exclusive)) |_| true else |_| false; |
| 1562 | defer if (locked) key_log_file.unlock(); |
| 1563 | key_log_file.seekFromEnd(0) catch {}; |
| 1564 | inline for (@typeInfo(@TypeOf(secrets)).@"struct".fields) |field| key_log_file.writer().print("{s}" ++ |
| 1565 | (if (@hasField(@TypeOf(context), "counter")) "_{d}" else "") ++ " {} {}\n", .{field.name} ++ |
| 1566 | (if (@hasField(@TypeOf(context), "counter")) .{context.counter} else .{}) ++ .{ |
| 1567 | std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(context.client_random), |
| 1568 | std.fmt.fmtSliceHexLower(@field(secrets, field.name)), |
| 1569 | }) catch {}; |
| 1570 | } |
| 1571 | |
| 1266 | 1572 | fn finishRead(c: *Client, frag: []const u8, in: usize, out: usize) usize { |
| 1267 | 1573 | const saved_buf = frag[in..]; |
| 1268 | 1574 | if (c.partial_ciphertext_idx > c.partial_cleartext_idx) { |
| ... | ... | @@ -1326,6 +1632,86 @@ inline fn big(x: anytype) @TypeOf(x) { |
| 1326 | 1632 | }; |
| 1327 | 1633 | } |
| 1328 | 1634 | |
| 1635 | const KeyShare = struct { |
| 1636 | ml_kem768_kp: crypto.kem.ml_kem.MLKem768.KeyPair, |
| 1637 | secp256r1_kp: crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP256Sha256.KeyPair, |
| 1638 | secp384r1_kp: crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP384Sha384.KeyPair, |
| 1639 | x25519_kp: crypto.dh.X25519.KeyPair, |
| 1640 | sk_buf: [sk_max_len]u8, |
| 1641 | sk_len: std.math.IntFittingRange(0, sk_max_len), |
| 1642 | |
| 1643 | const sk_max_len = @max( |
| 1644 | crypto.dh.X25519.shared_length + crypto.kem.ml_kem.MLKem768.shared_length, |
| 1645 | crypto.ecc.P256.scalar.encoded_length, |
| 1646 | crypto.ecc.P384.scalar.encoded_length, |
| 1647 | crypto.dh.X25519.shared_length, |
| 1648 | ); |
| 1649 | |
| 1650 | fn init(seed: [112]u8) error{IdentityElement}!KeyShare { |
| 1651 | return .{ |
| 1652 | .ml_kem768_kp = try .create(null), |
| 1653 | .secp256r1_kp = try .create(seed[0..32].*), |
| 1654 | .secp384r1_kp = try .create(seed[32..80].*), |
| 1655 | .x25519_kp = try .create(seed[80..112].*), |
| 1656 | .sk_buf = undefined, |
| 1657 | .sk_len = 0, |
| 1658 | }; |
| 1659 | } |
| 1660 | |
| 1661 | fn exchange( |
| 1662 | ks: *KeyShare, |
| 1663 | named_group: tls.NamedGroup, |
| 1664 | server_pub_key: []const u8, |
| 1665 | ) error{ TlsIllegalParameter, TlsDecryptFailure }!void { |
| 1666 | switch (named_group) { |
| 1667 | .x25519_ml_kem768 => { |
| 1668 | const hksl = crypto.kem.ml_kem.MLKem768.ciphertext_length; |
| 1669 | const xksl = hksl + crypto.dh.X25519.public_length; |
| 1670 | if (server_pub_key.len != xksl) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 1671 | |
| 1672 | const hsk = ks.ml_kem768_kp.secret_key.decaps(server_pub_key[0..hksl]) catch |
| 1673 | return error.TlsDecryptFailure; |
| 1674 | const xsk = crypto.dh.X25519.scalarmult(ks.x25519_kp.secret_key, server_pub_key[hksl..xksl].*) catch |
| 1675 | return error.TlsDecryptFailure; |
| 1676 | @memcpy(ks.sk_buf[0..hsk.len], &hsk); |
| 1677 | @memcpy(ks.sk_buf[hsk.len..][0..xsk.len], &xsk); |
| 1678 | ks.sk_len = hsk.len + xsk.len; |
| 1679 | }, |
| 1680 | .secp256r1 => { |
| 1681 | const PublicKey = crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP256Sha256.PublicKey; |
| 1682 | const pk = PublicKey.fromSec1(server_pub_key) catch return error.TlsDecryptFailure; |
| 1683 | const mul = pk.p.mulPublic(ks.secp256r1_kp.secret_key.bytes, .big) catch |
| 1684 | return error.TlsDecryptFailure; |
| 1685 | const sk = mul.affineCoordinates().x.toBytes(.big); |
| 1686 | @memcpy(ks.sk_buf[0..sk.len], &sk); |
| 1687 | ks.sk_len = sk.len; |
| 1688 | }, |
| 1689 | .secp384r1 => { |
| 1690 | const PublicKey = crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP384Sha384.PublicKey; |
| 1691 | const pk = PublicKey.fromSec1(server_pub_key) catch return error.TlsDecryptFailure; |
| 1692 | const mul = pk.p.mulPublic(ks.secp384r1_kp.secret_key.bytes, .big) catch |
| 1693 | return error.TlsDecryptFailure; |
| 1694 | const sk = mul.affineCoordinates().x.toBytes(.big); |
| 1695 | @memcpy(ks.sk_buf[0..sk.len], &sk); |
| 1696 | ks.sk_len = sk.len; |
| 1697 | }, |
| 1698 | .x25519 => { |
| 1699 | const ksl = crypto.dh.X25519.public_length; |
| 1700 | if (server_pub_key.len != ksl) return error.TlsIllegalParameter; |
| 1701 | const sk = crypto.dh.X25519.scalarmult(ks.x25519_kp.secret_key, server_pub_key[0..ksl].*) catch |
| 1702 | return error.TlsDecryptFailure; |
| 1703 | @memcpy(ks.sk_buf[0..sk.len], &sk); |
| 1704 | ks.sk_len = sk.len; |
| 1705 | }, |
| 1706 | else => return error.TlsIllegalParameter, |
| 1707 | } |
| 1708 | } |
| 1709 | |
| 1710 | fn getSharedSecret(ks: *const KeyShare) ?[]const u8 { |
| 1711 | return if (ks.sk_len > 0) ks.sk_buf[0..ks.sk_len] else null; |
| 1712 | } |
| 1713 | }; |
| 1714 | |
| 1329 | 1715 | fn SchemeEcdsa(comptime scheme: tls.SignatureScheme) type { |
| 1330 | 1716 | return switch (scheme) { |
| 1331 | 1717 | .ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 => crypto.sign.ecdsa.EcdsaP256Sha256, |
| ... | ... | @@ -1334,11 +1720,20 @@ fn SchemeEcdsa(comptime scheme: tls.SignatureScheme) type { |
| 1334 | 1720 | }; |
| 1335 | 1721 | } |
| 1336 | 1722 | |
| 1337 | | fn SchemeHash(comptime scheme: tls.SignatureScheme) type { |
| 1723 | fn SchemeRsa(comptime scheme: tls.SignatureScheme) type { |
| 1338 | 1724 | return switch (scheme) { |
| 1339 | | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 => crypto.hash.sha2.Sha256, |
| 1340 | | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 => crypto.hash.sha2.Sha384, |
| 1341 | | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 => crypto.hash.sha2.Sha512, |
| 1725 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha256, |
| 1726 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha384, |
| 1727 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha512, |
| 1728 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha1, |
| 1729 | => Certificate.rsa.PKCS1v1_5Signature, |
| 1730 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, |
| 1731 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, |
| 1732 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, |
| 1733 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha256, |
| 1734 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha384, |
| 1735 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha512, |
| 1736 | => Certificate.rsa.PSSSignature, |
| 1342 | 1737 | else => @compileError("bad scheme"), |
| 1343 | 1738 | }; |
| 1344 | 1739 | } |
| ... | ... | @@ -1350,6 +1745,146 @@ fn SchemeEddsa(comptime scheme: tls.SignatureScheme) type { |
| 1350 | 1745 | }; |
| 1351 | 1746 | } |
| 1352 | 1747 | |
| 1748 | fn SchemeHash(comptime scheme: tls.SignatureScheme) type { |
| 1749 | return switch (scheme) { |
| 1750 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha256, |
| 1751 | .ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, |
| 1752 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, |
| 1753 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha256, |
| 1754 | => crypto.hash.sha2.Sha256, |
| 1755 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha384, |
| 1756 | .ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, |
| 1757 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, |
| 1758 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha384, |
| 1759 | => crypto.hash.sha2.Sha384, |
| 1760 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha512, |
| 1761 | .ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, |
| 1762 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, |
| 1763 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha512, |
| 1764 | => crypto.hash.sha2.Sha512, |
| 1765 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha1, |
| 1766 | .ecdsa_sha1, |
| 1767 | => crypto.hash.Sha1, |
| 1768 | else => @compileError("bad scheme"), |
| 1769 | }; |
| 1770 | } |
| 1771 | |
| 1772 | const CertificatePublicKey = struct { |
| 1773 | algo: Certificate.AlgorithmCategory, |
| 1774 | buf: [600]u8, |
| 1775 | len: u16, |
| 1776 | |
| 1777 | fn init( |
| 1778 | cert_pub_key: *CertificatePublicKey, |
| 1779 | algo: Certificate.AlgorithmCategory, |
| 1780 | pub_key: []const u8, |
| 1781 | ) error{CertificatePublicKeyInvalid}!void { |
| 1782 | if (pub_key.len > cert_pub_key.buf.len) return error.CertificatePublicKeyInvalid; |
| 1783 | cert_pub_key.algo = algo; |
| 1784 | @memcpy(cert_pub_key.buf[0..pub_key.len], pub_key); |
| 1785 | cert_pub_key.len = @intCast(pub_key.len); |
| 1786 | } |
| 1787 | |
| 1788 | const VerifyError = error{ TlsDecodeError, TlsBadSignatureScheme, InvalidEncoding } || |
| 1789 | // ecdsa |
| 1790 | crypto.errors.EncodingError || |
| 1791 | crypto.errors.NotSquareError || |
| 1792 | crypto.errors.NonCanonicalError || |
| 1793 | SchemeEcdsa(.ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256).Signature.VerifyError || |
| 1794 | SchemeEcdsa(.ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384).Signature.VerifyError || |
| 1795 | // rsa |
| 1796 | error{TlsBadRsaSignatureBitCount} || |
| 1797 | Certificate.rsa.PublicKey.ParseDerError || |
| 1798 | Certificate.rsa.PublicKey.FromBytesError || |
| 1799 | Certificate.rsa.PSSSignature.VerifyError || |
| 1800 | Certificate.rsa.PKCS1v1_5Signature.VerifyError || |
| 1801 | // eddsa |
| 1802 | SchemeEddsa(.ed25519).Signature.VerifyError; |
| 1803 | |
| 1804 | fn verifySignature( |
| 1805 | cert_pub_key: *const CertificatePublicKey, |
| 1806 | sigd: *tls.Decoder, |
| 1807 | msg: []const []const u8, |
| 1808 | ) VerifyError!void { |
| 1809 | const pub_key = cert_pub_key.buf[0..cert_pub_key.len]; |
| 1810 | |
| 1811 | try sigd.ensure(2 + 2); |
| 1812 | const scheme = sigd.decode(tls.SignatureScheme); |
| 1813 | const sig_len = sigd.decode(u16); |
| 1814 | try sigd.ensure(sig_len); |
| 1815 | const encoded_sig = sigd.slice(sig_len); |
| 1816 | |
| 1817 | if (cert_pub_key.algo != @as(Certificate.AlgorithmCategory, switch (scheme) { |
| 1818 | .ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, |
| 1819 | .ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, |
| 1820 | => .X9_62_id_ecPublicKey, |
| 1821 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha256, |
| 1822 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha384, |
| 1823 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha512, |
| 1824 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, |
| 1825 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, |
| 1826 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, |
| 1827 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha1, |
| 1828 | => .rsaEncryption, |
| 1829 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha256, |
| 1830 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha384, |
| 1831 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha512, |
| 1832 | => .rsassa_pss, |
| 1833 | else => return error.TlsBadSignatureScheme, |
| 1834 | })) return error.TlsBadSignatureScheme; |
| 1835 | |
| 1836 | switch (scheme) { |
| 1837 | inline .ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, |
| 1838 | .ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, |
| 1839 | => |comptime_scheme| { |
| 1840 | const Ecdsa = SchemeEcdsa(comptime_scheme); |
| 1841 | const sig = try Ecdsa.Signature.fromDer(encoded_sig); |
| 1842 | const key = try Ecdsa.PublicKey.fromSec1(pub_key); |
| 1843 | var ver = try sig.verifier(key); |
| 1844 | for (msg) |part| ver.update(part); |
| 1845 | try ver.verify(); |
| 1846 | }, |
| 1847 | inline .rsa_pkcs1_sha256, |
| 1848 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha384, |
| 1849 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha512, |
| 1850 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, |
| 1851 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha384, |
| 1852 | .rsa_pss_rsae_sha512, |
| 1853 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha256, |
| 1854 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha384, |
| 1855 | .rsa_pss_pss_sha512, |
| 1856 | .rsa_pkcs1_sha1, |
| 1857 | => |comptime_scheme| { |
| 1858 | const RsaSignature = SchemeRsa(comptime_scheme); |
| 1859 | const Hash = SchemeHash(comptime_scheme); |
| 1860 | const PublicKey = Certificate.rsa.PublicKey; |
| 1861 | const components = try PublicKey.parseDer(pub_key); |
| 1862 | const exponent = components.exponent; |
| 1863 | const modulus = components.modulus; |
| 1864 | switch (modulus.len) { |
| 1865 | inline 128, 256, 384, 512 => |modulus_len| { |
| 1866 | const key: PublicKey = try .fromBytes(exponent, modulus); |
| 1867 | const sig = RsaSignature.fromBytes(modulus_len, encoded_sig); |
| 1868 | try RsaSignature.concatVerify(modulus_len, sig, msg, key, Hash); |
| 1869 | }, |
| 1870 | else => return error.TlsBadRsaSignatureBitCount, |
| 1871 | } |
| 1872 | }, |
| 1873 | inline .ed25519 => |comptime_scheme| { |
| 1874 | const Eddsa = SchemeEddsa(comptime_scheme); |
| 1875 | if (encoded_sig.len != Eddsa.Signature.encoded_length) return error.InvalidEncoding; |
| 1876 | const sig = Eddsa.Signature.fromBytes(encoded_sig[0..Eddsa.Signature.encoded_length].*); |
| 1877 | if (pub_key.len != Eddsa.PublicKey.encoded_length) return error.InvalidEncoding; |
| 1878 | const key = try Eddsa.PublicKey.fromBytes(pub_key[0..Eddsa.PublicKey.encoded_length].*); |
| 1879 | var ver = try sig.verifier(key); |
| 1880 | for (msg) |part| ver.update(part); |
| 1881 | try ver.verify(); |
| 1882 | }, |
| 1883 | else => unreachable, |
| 1884 | } |
| 1885 | } |
| 1886 | }; |
| 1887 | |
| 1353 | 1888 | /// Abstraction for sending multiple byte buffers to a slice of iovecs. |
| 1354 | 1889 | const VecPut = struct { |
| 1355 | 1890 | iovecs: []const std.posix.iovec, |
| ... | ... | @@ -1447,20 +1982,26 @@ fn limitVecs(iovecs: []std.posix.iovec, len: usize) []std.posix.iovec { |
| 1447 | 1982 | /// aes128-gcm: 138 MiB/s |
| 1448 | 1983 | /// aes256-gcm: 120 MiB/s |
| 1449 | 1984 | const cipher_suites = if (crypto.core.aes.has_hardware_support) |
| 1450 | | enum_array(tls.CipherSuite, &.{ |
| 1985 | array(u16, tls.CipherSuite, .{ |
| 1451 | 1986 | .AEGIS_128L_SHA256, |
| 1452 | 1987 | .AEGIS_256_SHA512, |
| 1453 | 1988 | .AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 1989 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 1454 | 1990 | .AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
| 1991 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
| 1455 | 1992 | .CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 1993 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 1456 | 1994 | }) |
| 1457 | 1995 | else |
| 1458 | | enum_array(tls.CipherSuite, &.{ |
| 1996 | array(u16, tls.CipherSuite, .{ |
| 1459 | 1997 | .CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 1998 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, |
| 1460 | 1999 | .AEGIS_128L_SHA256, |
| 1461 | 2000 | .AEGIS_256_SHA512, |
| 1462 | 2001 | .AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 2002 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, |
| 1463 | 2003 | .AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
| 2004 | .ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, |
| 1464 | 2005 | }); |
| 1465 | 2006 | |
| 1466 | 2007 | test { |
Jacob Young <jacobly@ziglang.org> 2024-11-08 02:01:52-05:00
GitHub <noreply@github.com> 2024-11-08 02:01:52-05:00
Signed by PGP key B5690EEEBB952194
lib